Highlighting effects of current globalization tenets, namely democracy, capitalism, and cultural transformation, on the Arab  Islamic Middle East by Richardson, David Lee.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-06
Highlighting effects of current globalization tenets,
namely democracy, capitalism, and cultural
transformation, on the Arab  Islamic Middle East
Richardson, David Lee.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
HIGHLIGHTING EFFECTS OF CURRENT 
GLOBALIZATION TENETS, NAMELY DEMOCRACY, 
CAPITALISM, AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION, ON 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Robert Looney 
  Abbas Kadhim 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE     Highlighting Effects of Current Globalization 
Tenets, Namely Democracy, Capitalism, and Cultural Transformation, on the Arab 
Islamic Middle East. 
6. AUTHOR     David L. Richardson Jr. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis examines the shape of globalization in the Middle East, specifically with respect to three major 
elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and culture.  This thesis attempts to shed light on the 
importance and difficulties of fostering positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs 
in the Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region’s and inevitably the world’s 
prosperity and stability.  Moreover, this thesis also addresses and analyzes the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the 
Middle East with current globalization trends.  Acknowledging that Middle Eastern globalization is a fairly large 
subject to cover, the scope of this research has been narrowed to answer the question of whether or not the acceptance 
of democracy, capitalism and cultural changes by Arab Islamic Middle Eastern societies, specifically the secular 
authoritarian regimes and the opposing Islamists organizations, could increase the prosperity and stability within the 
region, and if so, bring to light the obstacles which stand in the way of such progress. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
137 
14. SUBJECT TERMS     Middle East, Globalization, Democracy, Capitalism, Cultural, Islam, 
Arabs, Muslims, Terrorism 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
HIGHLIGHTING EFFECTS OF CURRENT GLOBALIZATION TENETS, 
NAMELY DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, AND CULTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION, ON THE ARAB ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
David L. Richardson Jr. 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1996 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the shape of globalization in the Middle East, specifically 
with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and 
culture.  This thesis attempts to shed light on the importance and difficulties of fostering 
positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs in the 
Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region’s and 
inevitably the world’s prosperity and stability.  Moreover, this thesis also addresses and 
analyzes the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization 
trends.  Acknowledging that Middle Eastern globalization is a fairly large subject to 
cover, the scope of this research has been narrowed to answer the question of whether or 
not the acceptance of democracy, capitalism and cultural changes by Arab Islamic 
Middle Eastern societies, specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing 
Islamists organizations, could increase the prosperity and stability within the region, and 
if so, bring to light the obstacles which stand in the way of such progress. 
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In Search of World Peace and Prosperity through the Embracement 
of Globalization in the Arab Islamic Middle East 
A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a 
partnership of democratic nations . . . (world) peace must be planted upon 
the tested foundations of political liberty.1  
President Woodrow Wilson 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the shape of globalization in the Middle East, specifically 
with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, economics, and 
culture.  This thesis attempts to shed light on the importance and difficulties of fostering 
positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for Islamic Arabs in the 
Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing the region’s and 
inevitably the world’s prosperity and stability.  Moreover, this thesis also addresses and 
analyzes the compatibility of Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization 
trends.  Acknowledging that Middle Eastern globalization is a fairly large subject to 
cover, the scope of this research has been narrowed to answer the question of whether or 
not the acceptance of democracy, capitalism and cultural changes by Arab Islamic 
Middle Eastern societies, specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing 
Islamists organizations, could increase the prosperity and stability within the region, and 
if so, bring to light the obstacles which stand in the way of such progress. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The topic of this thesis originates from the issues which the world community, in 
general, has encountered due to the regional stagnation of the Middle East, which is 
attributable to the increased political, economic, and cultural turmoil created partly by the 
Islamists and the reactionary and irreversible military and police retaliatory actions that 
                                                 
1 President Woodrow Wilson's “Declaration of War Message to Congress,” April 2, 1917; Records of 
the United States Senate; Record Group 46; National Archives. 
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have occurred within the Muslim population of the Middle East.  The objective of this 
thesis is to highlight the affects of current globalization and bring to ideas and solutions 
which could potentially help to marginalize or moderate hostility within the region, 
leaving more time, energy, and resources for the enrichment of the Muslim population at 
large, the Middle East region, and the world as a whole. 
If we look at this crisis through a political, economical, and cultural lens, we may 
be able to postulate that Islamic Arabs could eventual and fully accept the influence of 
current globalization into the societies in which they reside.  If acceptance of 
globalization can be obtained successfully in the Middle East, the effects of positive 
economic growth, political autonomy, and cultural modernity could light the pathway for 
Islamic Arab populations on the road to a better quality of life.  Although easier said than 
done, in order to pursue this path to a better life, among many other issues, secular 
authoritarian regimes will need to adjust the political structure, Islamists will need to 
moderate there political agendas, and culture shifts within the populous will need to take 
place.  
On the other hand, globalization is not just a one way street, and there is another 
variable in this equation.  The states which are encouraging, fostering, and promoting 
current globalization and all its elements around the world have a responsibility too.  
Globalization will not be accepted at face value nor will it be accepted voluntarily, and by 
no means should it be forced upon the Middle East.  Forcing globalization onto societies 
that are neither prepared for nor educated to the political, economical, and cultural 
changes that must preemptively take place in order to successfully globalize, will not 
only be counter productive to the globalization process, but will make it more difficult 
and possibly impossible to construct the necessary foundation upon which productivity 
and prosperity are in present day being built upon.  Therefore, it is the responsibility of 
those encouraging globalization, in this case mainly western powers, to study and 
understand the Middle Eastern societies which hinder globalization.  Those powers must 
understand the history, personality, and culture of those societies, and create relationships 
which will aid in the coordination of society tailored globalization learning.  Lastly, and 
more importantly, Middle Eastern societies must be made aware and see the benefits of 
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fostering current globalization.  The spark or ignition for globalization can be lit by 
external forces, but the oxygen, fuel, and heat to keep the fire going must come from 
within the society, and can only be done by a society which is educated on, passionate 
about, and truly comprehends globalization. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
With 9/11 in the world’s rear view mirror and the Global War on Terror, or newly 
coined “Overseas Contingency Operations,” currently in the driver’s seat, what is next on 
the horizon?  Could we be on the road to a Kantian like “perpetual peace?” If peace is in 
fact on the horizon, one must address the political, economical, and cultural turmoil 
associated with many of the Arab Islamic countries in the Middle East.  Islam and its 
devout followers seem to be in the spotlight and under the microscope these days, but 
much of the media attention and resources seem to be directed not on the actions of the 
Muslim majorities but on those actions of the violent and radical Islamist minorities.  
Although military force is currently being used to quell the violent actions of such 
extremists, it seems to be only a short term solution to a rather long and complicated 
dilemma which has come to fruition due to feelings of repression, political exclusion, and 
social/cultural stagnation, in other words the roots causes of Islamists’ actions and 
regional instability.  In many cases, foreign military power and local police actions will 
continue to defeat individual violent Islamist groups, but other, potentially more violent 
and more global groups, will inevitably rise up and take their place.  So, what other 
options are out there?  I believe the answer rests not with short term band-aid like 
military fixes but rests with a true to concentration on the root causes Middle East 
instability. 
As Peter Mandaville stated, “for many Muslims, globalization is still associated 
with Westernization and new forms of hegemony,”2 in a sense globalization is one of the 
reasons for the Islamist revival.  Islamism partially stems from the failure of secular 
Islamic revolutionaries and nationalists, of the past, to economically, militarily, and 
culturally globalize the Middle East.  So, if failure of past globalization is the reason for 
                                                 
2 Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 350. 
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the rise of Islamism, then certainly successful globalization could potentially be the cure.  
The answer thus lies in understanding and concentration on not just the Islamists’ short 
term violence, but on a deeper understanding of the Islamists’ true goals and root causes 
of frustration, the secular authoritarian regime power struggle, and how to blend and 
adapt globalization into a tasteful Middle Eastern flavor.  Therefore, my hypothesis is 
two fold.  First, that openly communicating and addressing the root causes that create 
obstacles and tension at the local and regional levels between secular authoritarian 
regimes, Islamists, and the trapped societies in between will help to create a better 
foundation for eventually fostering globalization in the Middle East.  Secondly, that the 
building blocks which will be placed on that foundation of understanding will be shaped 
by encouraging current globalization forces, and melding or massaging globalization to 
fit into a Middle Eastern mold which can be accepted by the parties involved. 
For many years theorists, scholars, and political leaders believed that conveying 
the idea of democracy, capitalism, and western culture to secular authoritarian states may 
eventually bring about a long term and positive solution to the problem of violent faction 
emergence, although this conveyance does not fully equal globalization.3  In the past, the 
debate amongst the Middle East and Arab world seemed to stem from the question of 
whether or not Islam and its Muslim followers were compatible with the idea of current 
globalization, and more specifically the ideas of democracy, capitalism, and cultural 
modernity.  Today, this idea has been partially answered by the political events within 
Arab Islamic countries which resemble “democratic like” political progress and political 
learning, almost a hybrid between democracy and authoritarianism.  For instance counties 
like Egypt and Morocco have recently allowed moderate Islamist parties into the political 
arena, for example the Wasat and PJD respectively.  In cases like these, the resident 
Islamist groups began to exhibited signs of moving away from violence, and in other 
cases, publicly renouncing violence or other similar acts, in order to obtain or maintain 
their legitimate political status with the state.  Again, this paper will reflect on the  
 
                                                 
3 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism, Past and Present,” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), The 
New Global Terrorism, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 92–105. 
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compatibility of Islamic Arabs and current globalization, as well as the political, 
economical, and cultural conditions within the Middle East that could foster a type of 
compatibility with globalization.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The analytical approach to this thesis will be fairly linear in fashion.  Initially, an 
attempt has been made to describe and lay out a description and definition of the term 
Globalization, especially in reference to the Middle East.  Because of the various 
globalization definitions, several theories are introduced, from writers like Thomas 
Friedman, Martin Wolf, and Charles Wheelan, which generate a definition that is 
appropriate for the Middle East. 
From this definition of globalization, I intended to use some case study analysis in 
analyzing the political elements of globalization, by using a variety of historical political 
cases which have had both positive and negative affects on the politics in the Middle 
East.  I will use theories from Robert Dahl, Asef Bayat and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, 
Olivier Roy, Amin Saikal, Peter Mandaville, and other scholars, and focus on their 
examination of Islamic democratization and Islamist political inclusion. 
Next, I will tackle the economic element of globalization with respect to Islam by 
examining the theories of Charles Wheelan, Frederic L. Pryor, Barry Rubin and others, as 
well as looking at some Middle East economic and statistical data (GDP, Religious 
Populations, and the like) over the past decade.  Although I plan on addressing the 
theories of Islam and capitalism in this section I will also address this relationship in the 
political section, as well, by addressing its relative existence to and interdependence on 
the democratic principles. 
Finally, I will address the cultural element of globalization by analyzing the 
works of authors like John Esposito and Marvin Gettleman, in order to gain insight into 
the Moderate Muslim world which I will then compare to the extreme violent Muslims 




Sayyid Qutb and Raymond Ibrahim in order to gain a primal understanding of the 
Islamist mind.  In order to tie these elements together I will again refer to authors like 
Amin Saikal and Mark Juergensmeyer. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In the introduction section, I have described the motivation for this thesis, which 
is to highlight the affects of current globalization on the Arab Islamic Middle East.  By 
understanding some of these affects it may be possible to foster further ideas for melding 
current globalization with the Middle East, thus regaining prosperity and security in this 
part of the world and inevitably the rest of the world. 
The body of the thesis will be divided up into four main sections.  The first 
chapter will consist of a description of current globalization, Islamic obstacles to 
globalization, and ideological differences between the globalized and non-globalized 
worlds.  The second chapter will consist of an examination of the political element of 
globalization, lightly addressing the questions about the compatibility of democracy and 
Islam, heavily addressing current Middle Eastern political regime troubles, and finally 
touching on the relationship between the fundamentals of democratization and the 
Islamic religion.  The third chapter will examine the economic element of globalization 
and look at the reasons why the Middle East has done so poorly in the world market and 
shred some light on which obstacles need to be removed in order to get back in the game.  
The last chapter will attempt to examine the cultural element of globalization, focusing 
on the spectrum of Islamic followers, from the Islamic secularist to the extremely violent 
Islamist, to see what Middle Eastern cultural characteristics can be leveraged to 
marginalize the Islamist.  Finally, in the conclusion, I will attempt to offer a collection of 
scholarly predictions about the road ahead and globalization in the Middle East. 
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II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
A. CULTURAL MODERNITY AND GLOBALIZATION 
So what is Globalization?  To understand this phenomenon properly we must first 
understand its components and how each one of them works individually and how they 
work together as a whole.  Of course globalization is a quite complicated event with 
multiple variables which can be very misunderstood and misinterpreted.  Barry Rubin of 
YaleGlobal provided a decent but broad definition of globalization, stating that 
“globalization refers to the spread throughout the globe of ideas, customs, institutions, 
and attitudes originated in one part of the world.”4  In a century where another round of 
globalization, of a Western flavor, is upon us, countries of the world are once again 
required to be flexible and adapt their cultures to the modern changes that are necessary 
for continued self growth and world growth.  The topic of globalization is quite 
controversial and is being studied, written about, and debated on a daily basis around the 
world.  The book Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives by 
Anthony Giddens and The World Is Flat by Thomas Friedman are examples of today’s 
ongoing globalization debate. 
In an age where technology permits much of the world access to just about any 
information almost instantaneously, which in turn, increases the average person’s 
intelligence level; people in general are getting a taste of modernity and diversity and a 
chance to build a new and better life.  Globalization, in the most basic sense, consists of 
cultural and social, economic, political, and even technological elements.  Globalization 
itself is not a new concept, but in fact, has been around throughout the several hundred 
centuries.  It is a constant process that ebbs and flows like the tide, but never truly goes 
away.  Globalization tends to represent the ideas or ideologies of the most successful 
culture or society of the time.  Globalization in the 21st Century has been portrayed by 
many as mainly Western in nature.  That is, 21st Century Globalization has specific 
characteristics associated with its basic elements.  This Western flavor consists of the 
                                                 
4 Barry Rubin, “Globalization and the Middle East: Part One,” YaleGlobal Online, 16 January 2003, 2. 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=744. 
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specific elements of technical and social modernity, Western culture, capitalism, and 
democracy.  With this understanding, globalization has deep generic roots in cultural 
modernity, which in the past has always been a threat to the tradition, especially in 
religious traditions.5 
B. IS GLOBALIZATION A PARADOX OR AN ANSWER? 
Another question to resolve is whether current globalization is self-sustaining or 
self-defeating.  If history could speak, its answer would likely be, “like all forms of 
globalization in the past, it will eventually run out of steam.”  It is evident that current 
globalization trends do have steam today, but for how long?  Is globalization self-
defeating?  The answer is not as self evident as one might think, and may only be 
answered by analyzing past trends.  Those Islamists who are battling against current 
globalization, in fact, use those same elements of globalization to fight against it, 
specifically world wide travel, technology, open borders, mass communication, media, 
and the internet, to name a few.  Their goal is to disestablish and build up a resistance to 
globalization.  Therefore, this creates a globalization paradox for those defending 
globalization.  Can an Islamic culture accept globalization without being totally changed 
into an unrecognizable society by those same globalization elements? 
With respect to the Islamists living in the Muslim world, globalization also 
creates a paradox which has not been recognized by those fighting against it.  On the 
outside, Islamists seem to be fighting against globalization, but this needs to be examined 
more carefully.  The fact is that Islamists, on the inside, are ultimately pro-globalization, 
but not of the Western kind described above.  Islamists want to spread Islam, and they 
want the world under an Islamic umbrella, practicing an Islamic form of globalization.  
As described above, the paradox is that the Islamists are themselves using many of the 
same elements of current globalization in their fight against that same globalization and 
in the promotion of Islamic globalization.  In other words, Islamists cannot attempt to 
defeat current globalization without using the elements of current globalization. 
                                                 
5 Barry Rubin, “Globalization and the Middle East: Part One,” YaleGlobal Online, 16 January 2003, 2. 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=744. 
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 C. GLOBALIZATION AND THE ISLAMIC “FATS” 
Thomas Friedman stated that “politics in the flat world will consist of asking 
which values, frictions, and fats are worth preserving . . . and which must be left to melt 
away into the air.”6  Friedman hit the nail on the head with this point.  There are obstacles 
standing in the way of globalization, i.e., the values, frictions, and fats as he has stated 
above.  But then again, it is not as simple as it may seem to allow these things to just fly 
away.  There is a dilemma and a paradox to deal with here.  Predominately Muslim states 
want to maintain their Islamic identity, but without dissolving those identity “frictions” 
they will most certainly loose out on globalization, on the other hand if they fully accept 
globalization they in fact risk loosing some of their cultural and religious identity.  So, 
can a state or people fully adapt to globalization without giving up their entire identity, 
“habits, cultures, and traditions?”7  The truth is, nations have been adapting and evolving 
to globalization for centuries.  People and cultures have been adapting their identities in 
order to survive and some have traded in many of their “frictions” in order to compete 
and be successful in the global market, Japan and the U.S. for example.  In many ways, in 
today’s society, one could look at the hierarchy (wealth and productivity) of the nations 
of the world, and correlated it to the amount of adaptation they have made with respect to 
globalization. 
For example, religion, one of the most prominent frictions in the world, has been 
around for centuries.  Many countries were founded and formed upon certain religious 
doctrine, and in many cases even went to war over it. Take for instance the United States, 
which is at the top of the hierological world power pyramid, was predominately founded 
by settlers who based their beliefs upon Protestant doctrine.8  Today, it can be argued that 
the United States, in general, is “Christian” based, but is also a nation which is very 
understanding, tolerant, and accepting of just about every other religious practice.  That 
cannot be said about other countries of the world especially those that are intolerable of 
                                                 
6 Thomas L Friedman, The World is Flat, (New York: Picador 2005), 259. 
7 Ibid., 236. 
8 CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. “GDP,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008). 
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other religions and less secular beliefs, therefore remaining at the bottom of the pyramid.  
Many counties in the Middle East fall into this later category.9 
That is not to say people and cultures should give up their identity to be 
successful in today’s global market.  Moreover, states should plainly become more 
tolerant and understanding of other cultures and beliefs.  Some fundamentalist groups, 
like Al-Qaeda, which would be considered a “friction” factor, would argue that becoming 
more tolerant or more secular is wrong for an Islamic nation.  The fact is, this adaptation 
does not happen overnight. It is a generational evolution that takes place over time.  The 
question then becomes how far should a nation go and how much (cultural, values, 
beliefs) should a nation give up or tolerate in order to get on the globalization train?  The 
fear is that there is a point at which the world can or will, as Friedman stated it, “loose 
something important,”10 and that is what we need to be careful and mindful of.  We must 
be cautious and conscious not to loose the identity which defines us, but at the same time 
we must accept and promote globalization and become integrated with the rest of the 
world.  Again, a fine line we must be aware of. 
D. CAN GLOBALIZATION ADDRESS THE CAUSES OF MIDDLE EAST 
TERRORISM? 
Is it possible the world perceives that the word “Terrorism” and the Middle East 
region tend to go hand in hand, and therefore that this relationship has a propensity to 
inhibit globalization in this area of the world.  In several of her scholarly works, Martha 
Crenshaw has explained cogently what the causes of terrorism are.  If globalization 
addresses these causes, we can defeat terrorism?  This section reflects upon the ideas 
behind the use of terrorism in the Middle East, and whether or not the ideas behind 
globalization can address the root causes of such disparity. 
                                                 
9 CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008.). 
10 Thomas L Friedman, The World is Flat, (New York: Picador 2005), 236. 
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There is no doubt that Crenshaw has logically explained the causes and conditions 
of terrorism.11  There is no doubt if we could address the causes and conditions of 
terrorism, in a perfect world, we would, in fact, eradicate terrorism.  But we are by no 
means lining in a perfect world and definitely not a utopia.  So, I believe the question is 
not whether we can defeat terrorism itself, but whether or not we can address the causes 
and conditions that make terrorism a tactical option.  The question of whether terrorism 
will ever truly be defeated is a quite relevant one, but not realistic.  My hypothesis to this 
question is that the answer is more complicated than a simple “yes” or “no.” 
It is an obvious fact that the use of terrorism as a tactic has been around for 
centuries.  Although it is generally a tactic of the weak, it has been used by the strong and 
the weak alike, from strong states to weak states and large factions to small guerilla 
groups.  It has been seen as an effective tactic by those who have chosen to use it to 
achieve their goal or goals and by those factions it has been used against.  Even though 
there are many forms and groups of terrorist sects, for the purpose of this thesis I will 
briefly utilize the violent extreme Islamist groups as the examples.  The Islamist 
extremist groups easily display both a religious and political aspects within the cause(s) 
for which the group is fight for or defending.  It is for these duel motivations (political 
and religious) that make answering the question of whether terrorism will ever truly be 
defeated, more complicated, and an almost impossible to postulate a formidable response. 
This investigation is by no means an end all be all answer to defeating the causes 
and conditions of terrorism altogether.  On the contrary, it is more or less a light surface 
scan of the basic building blocks of terrorism, i.e., Crenshaw’s causal conditions of why 
terrorism eventually becomes an option.  Before this section goes too deep into answering 
the question of whether or not the causes of terrorism can be defeated, I would like to 
address what some scholars believe and many governments have implemented in the 
past, are the possible treatments of terrorism. 
 
                                                 
11 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), The New Global Terrorism, 92–
105. 
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Let begin with a look at Crenshaw’s “conditions” of terrorism.  In the book The 
New Global Terrorism by Charles W. Kegley Jr., Part Two, Chapter Eight “The Causes 
of Terrorisms,” Crenshaw describes what she believes to be the causes of terrorism.12  
Crenshaw briefly attests to the notion that “modernization” and “urbanization” are the 
factors that aid in creating the framework from which brew the basic foundations of 
terrorism ideologies.13  Furthermore, for this essay it will be assumed that urbanization is 
a byproduct of modernization, and that modernization is the original foundation of 
terrorism.  Again, this paper is not meant to prove or disprove the causes of terrorism, but 
to rather understand why terrorism can neither be truly avoided nor destroyed altogether. 
The obvious point which can be inferred is that, if modernization itself is the basic 
building block for the causes of terrorism, we can never truly defeat terrorism.   
Modernization by itself is an unstoppable force which is needed in order to continue and 
sustain life on earth as we know it.  If this is true, we must then look at the causal 
conditions of terrorism that spawn from modernization.  Crenshaw states that 
modernization over the years has generated so many religious, “social” and “economical 
complexities,” and it is from the complexities, that “grievances” are created and formed 
in certain minority groups.14  Moreover, it is this formed grievance that, if powerful 
enough, will eventually create an overwhelming amount of dissatisfaction and 
resentment.  If we could somehow stop this condition of terrorism here (i.e., allow the 
grieved party to express themselves) there would most likely be less of a reason for the 
grieved party to possibly feel the need to adopt the tactic of terrorism. 
In order for the grieved party to be heard, they would need some kind of outlet 
from which to be heard.  This then leads us to the second condition of terrorism, which is 
described by Crenshaw as the lack of opportunity for “political participation.”15  
Undoubtedly, if we allowed the grieved party to express themselves in a formal and 
                                                 
12 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), The New Global Terrorism. 92–
105. 
13 Ibid., 93–94. 
14 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed), The New Global Terrorism, 94. 
15 Ibid., 95. 
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political way, we would surely then be able to stop the build up of dissatisfaction and 
resentment, right?  On the contrary, political participation alone would be the easy 
solution, but it is more detailed and complicated than that.  When needs and grievances 
are not met by through political participation, to the satisfaction of the grieved party, the 
grieved party again begins to build dissatisfaction and resentment.  Thus leading the same 
grieved parties to possibly ascertain terrorism as a means through which to be heard and 
have its requests met. 
At this point we can stop at general conditions of terrorism, because it is from this 
point we can only diverge into the individual causations of the many different dissatisfied 
organizations.  It is at this point that exist the many reasons why some groups chose 
terrorism as their method whiles others do not, and it is here that it becomes an 
overwhelming debate which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Now that we have addressed the possible conditions for terrorism, let’s look at 
Mark Juergensmeyer “cures” of terrorism.  In his book Terror in the Mind of God, 
Juergensmeyer sums it up quite nicely by describing five potential “cures” for 
terrorism.16   The first is described as basic brute force, in a sense just destroying the 
terrorist with an overwhelming destructive and annihilating power.17  The second is as 
basic reversal of terror, in that, the mere threat of violence or retaliation by a government 
organization, or the like, may create doubt or vacillation in the minds of a terrorist 
organization, thereby halting their future actions.18  Third, the terrorist organization itself, 
through the use of violence, attains its goal, and hence ceases to use further aggressive 
attacks.19  A fourth ending would be to separate the religious aspects of the cause from 
the political aspect of the cause.20  As Juergensmeyer points out, and many other scholars 
concur, negotiation with or bullying a religious fundamentalist group would most likely 
be in vain.  Hence, dealing with a political element alone, has a higher probability of 
                                                 
16 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror In The Mind Of God (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2003)  
17 Ibid., 233–34. 
18 Ibid., 236–237. 
19 Ibid., 238–239. 
20 Ibid., 240–241. 
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success and compromise.  Lastly, and almost a reverse to the fourth ending, adding a 
“moral integrity” aspect to politics on the part of the government authorities, by basically 
gaining, at a minimum, a pseudo trust of a terrorist sect by adopting and demonstrating a 
sense of devout morality within the accused governmental organization.21  At the same 
time we must address the assumption that there are several variations of outcomes 
(actions and reactions), but these five represent a good summation and generalization of 
various historical endings. 
With that said, let us briefly turn to Islamism as an example of why these 
conditions will never truly be eradicated, why terrorism as a means will never truly be 
defeated by globalization, and why the “cures” stated earlier are only effective to a point 
and don’t address the initial building blocks of terrorism.  The answer and example 
presented may be over-simplistic in nature, and can lead to a lengthily discussion, but this 
cannot be entirely accomplished within the scope of this thesis.  Simply put, one reason 
why these causes and conditions (modernization, settling of grievances, and political 
participation) can never truly be addressed when dealing with Islamists, and hence why 
Islamist sects who exercise terrorism will truly never be defeated or go away, rests 
merely in the complex nature of Islam.  The simple answer is that Islam is a “religion and 
a state.”22  Many scholars will agree with the statement that terrorism by definition is 
political in nature, and that Islamist themselves are in the “fight,” with political agenda in 
their back pocket.23  In the Islamic faith, there is also no objection, by those same 
scholars, to the fact that in Islam, the religious aspect and political aspect are connected 
by unbreakable bond, for as described by Johannes J.G. Jansen’s book, The Dual Nature 
of Islamic Fundamentalism.  The problem is two fold.  First, modernization by nature 
creates fundamentalists, i.e., those minority groups mainly on the fringes of a society who 
want to return to the days of old, i.e., pre-enlightenment.  By modernization alone you 
                                                 
21 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror In The Mind Of God, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 243–
245. 
22 Carl L. Brown, Religion and State: the Muslim Approach to Policitcs, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000), 31. 
23 Abdel S. Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1996), 3. 
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create a minority group with a grievance.  In a sense, if we believe that modernization is 
necessary for the earth to sustain life, Crenshaw’s first condition of terrorism, minority 
groups with grievances, is inevitable for the foreseeable future.  We can not simply turn 
back the hands of time.  Secondly, when dealing with a religious or divine aspect, in most 
cases there is no compromise.  As Juergensmeyer describes, compromise with the 
religious aspect of a fundamentalist group is near impossible. 24  Due to the fact that the 
Islamist religious aspect is permanently bonded to the political aspect, the two shall never 
be separated. The second condition of terrorism cannot be successfully addressed either, 
due to this unwavering and uncompromising nature, especially in the religious aspect, of 
Islamism.  In a sense, attempting to deal politically, and hence create a compromise, with 
the religious aspects of the Islamic would be fruitless.  For this reason, “this prevents the 
fundamentalist leaders from participating in government.”25  It can be said that any of 
Juergensmeyer’s five “cures” could be effective against the Islamist, some better than 
others, but only up until the point where grievances are formed and modernization takes 
place. 
Again this is overly simplistic, but my final thought is that terrorism, especially 
under the extremely violent Islamic terrorist wing, will never truly be dissolved, even in a 
totally globalized world.  The fact remains that there will always be a time and a place, 
even in a constantly modernizing world, where and when a weak minority group will feel 
they must resort to terrorism or a terrorist act in order to be heard and create change.  For 
Islamic Fundamentalism, the answer may not lie within the boundaries of the causes and 
conditions of terrorism, but may lie within the boundaries of the Islamic Faith itself.  As 
Marari pointed, out most terrorist groups tend to act within the boundaries of their 
constituency’s approval.26  So, if the terrorism is contained within constituency, it is the 
constituency that must be manipulated to not approve the use of terrorism.  This is a great 
topic of discussion which is currently being research by scholars today. 
                                                 
24 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror In The Mind Of God, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 241. 
25 Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1997), 
24. 
26 Ariel Merari, “Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism,” in Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, 
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III. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON MIDDLE EAST 
POLITICS 
A. POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 
The question of democratizing Islam in this fashion has been examined by Asef 
Bayat, in his book, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamic 
Turn (Stanford University Press: 2007), by Amin Saikal’s book, Islam and the West: 
Conflict or Cooperation (Palgrave MacMillan 2003), by Eva Wegner’s article, “Islamist 
Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation,”27 and by Carrie 
Rosefsky Wickham’s essay, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and learning in the 
Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.”28  There are similar and reoccurring arguments that 
these works have in common, basically stated, that the road to democratization, as these 
authors generally suggest, is made up of a few essential elements. The first, as stated 
above, is that the road to democratization will be paved through the state or leading 
authority’s inclusion rather than exclusion of Islamists parties into the political system.  
The second element revolves around the Islamists making some concessions of their own, 
and moderating mainly their individual groups’ violent actions and/or radical objectives.  
The authors also agree that democracy, whatever Middle Eastern or Arab form is created, 
will take time to foster and implement, will be a lengthy process, and will certainly not 
happen over night.  Furthermore, democratization will not happen without its ups and 
downs, setbacks, pain, frustration, and will require an essential focus on continuous and 
steady “forward” progress.29  If forward democratic learning progress is not properly 
fostered and carefully orchestrated on both sides, the result could be a paradoxical 
regression back to violence and political exclusion. 
                                                 
27 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win 
Situation,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, (January 2004), 205–228. 
28 Eva Wegner “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat 
Party,” In Oliver Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non 
Democratic Regimes, (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), 75–89. 
29 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamic Turn, (Stanford 
University Press: 2007), 14. Amin Saikal, Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation, (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 139. 
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B. DEMOCRATIZATION WITH PROPER AND IMPROPER POLITICAL 
LEARNING 
The interesting dilemma faced here is a double edged sword for both the state 
authority and the Islamists.  First, in general terms, states and governing authorities, run 
into problems when deciding whether or not to include or exclude Islamist groups in their 
political process.  Basically, the governing authority must decide whether to exclude a 
particular Islamist group, and run the risk of fostering a more hostile Islamist 
organization or greater environment for violence, or chose to include the Islamist group, 
and run the risk of actually being politically beaten by or politically overpowered by a 
popular radical Islamist group.  The opposition also possesses a similar volatile dilemma.  
On the same note, the Islamists must also be very careful.  If the Islamist group is too 
radical, violent, or threatening to the political power of the governing authority, they run 
the risk of being suppressed even further by that authority.  On the other hand, if the 
Islamist moderate too much and too fast, in order to appease the governing authority and 
gain access into the political arena, they run the risk of isolating or “alienating” their own 
network of followers, who may see these concessions as giving into the system they are 
in fact struggling against.30  These quandaries lead to the ups and downs in which 
governing authorities and opposing Islamist parties go though in order to understand the 
process of democratic learning and find the right give and take balance. 
The authors emphasize that states and Islamists need to understand this give and 
take “balancing act” in order to undergo a democratic learning process and make forward 
progress towards democratization.  As their scholarly works suggest, allowing Islamists 
into the political arena is a balancing act for both the governing authority and the 
Islamists.  On one side, allowing Islamists to enter the political arena (inclusion) allows 
them to voice their grievances, which resolves their feeling of repression and hence less 
of a reason to resort to violence.  On the other side, if the Islamists are able to rally a 
majority of the people, they threaten the very governing authority allowing them to 
participate, which could lead to exclusion.  This is a balancing act that can only be 
                                                 
30 Eva Wegner, Islamist Inclusion and regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation, 
Comparative Politics (January 2004): Vol. 36, No. 2, 77. 
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understood and eventually overcome by going through the democratic learning process, 
as will be discussed in a few historical cases studies. 
C. IS DEMOCRATIZATION DOOMED IN THE MIDDLE EAST? 
Middle Eastern societies are trapped between authoritarian elites and radical 
Islamist movements.  The authoritarian elites do not want to give up power and the 
Islamists are not interested in democracy.  Democratization is doomed in the Middle East 
until either the elites or the Islamists lose their power. 
1. The Stance 
First, this thesis disagrees with the statements that Islamists are not interested in 
democracy and that democratization is doomed in the Middle East until either the elites 
or Islamists lose power.  However, it does agree with the statements that authoritarian 
elites do not want to give up or lose their power, and also that Middle Eastern societies 
are trapped between authoritarian elites and radical Islamists movements. 
2. Islamists and Democracy 
To begin, not all Islamists are created equal and there is wide range of beliefs and 
variance among Islamist parties. 31  Another way to view this issue, for example, as Peter 
Mandaville explains it; there are basically two types of Islamist camps, those who 
promote the unembellished translation of the Qur’an and sunna (the literalists) and those 
who view these teachings as a set of guiding principles, and along those same line there 
are “new” and “old” Islamist variants.32  The fact is, there are Islamists throughout the 
fundamentalist spectrum that have seen positive gains and see future potential in having a 
democratic political system and institution in Middle Eastern countries.  Similarly, there 
are Islamists throughout the spectrum who believe that “God, who is the sole source of 
political authority and from whose divine law must come all regulations governing the 
                                                 
31 Carrie R. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s 
Wasat Party,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, (January 2004), 206. 
32 Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 336 and 351. 
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community of believers,”33 and that there is no place for political intervention or 
suffrage.  For the purpose of this essay I will defend the statement that not all Islamists 
are antidemocratic by referencing several specific case studies from the Middle Eastern 
region. 
Now one does not have to dig too deep to find Islamist parties that have 
cooperated politically (i.e., played by the electorate system rules) or moderated their 
goals and objectives in order to participate in democratic elections.  Islamist parties such 
as Egypt’s Wasat party, Morocco’s Party for Justice and Reform (PJD), formerly the 
Islamist Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR) party, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS), Palestine’s Hamas, and Turkey’s Justice for Development (AKP) party have all 
demanded participation in the electoral process,34 and some currently hold political 
positions within their individual systems.  What these examples demonstrate is that 
Islamists are willing to participate in a democratic like process, but is this proof enough 
to say that there are Islamists who believe in a democratic process?  What is still under 
contention and debatable is whether or not these types of Islamists truly believe in the 
democratic process and values in which they are participating or whether they are using 
the process to get into power and eventually (big picture) rid themselves of the 
authoritarian regime and the democratic process altogether, so that they would make 
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as seen in the cases of the Wasat, PJD, and Hamas parties which have all obtained 
democratically elected positions and have not attempted to radically change their political 
systems.36 
As described above, the proof is in the pudding and there are several Islamists 
parties interested in democracy whether it is a Western brand, Middle Eastern brand, or 
some combination of the two, and they are willing to practice and take part in several 
components of democratic learning. 
3. Is Democratization Really Doomed in the Middle East? 
Democratization is not doomed in the Middle East and what this statement is 
missing is the fact that democratization has been taking place in several countries 
throughout the Middle East without the total loss of power on either side.  As described 
in the section above, just inclusion and participation of Islamist parties in the political 
arena of some non-democratic authoritarian countries (for example Egypt) provides the 
region with a taste, although in some cases only a small taste, of democratic learning and 
a so called form of Middle Eastern democratization.37  This is by no means to say that the 
political systems in these cases are prefect or quickly on their way to becoming western 
like democracies, not at all.  Most of the political systems in the Middle East are still very 
much secular and autocratic.38  Democratization is a process which takes time to occur; it 
has ups, downs, setbacks, and progress all along its journey to acceptance.  Turkey is a 
prime example of a country that is well on its way to transitioning to a fully competitive 
democratic nation with neither the elites nor the opposition parties totally losing power.  
As Michele Angrist stated, there are three pivotal parts to Turkey’s competitive electoral 
political success, the number of political parties within the political arena, the polarizing 
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core values between the parties, and the ability of those parties to mobilize support.39  In 
the Middle East, it is true that most secular Authoritarian regimes have had unsuccessful 
competitive political systems due to a failure in one or more of these critical areas, but 
that is not to say that that is not part of the process of political learning and part of the 
road toward eventually competitive political success.  The Wasat and PJD parties are 
good examples of instances in which secular authoritarian countries, which are in the mist 
of political learning and understanding, have multiple parties, similar party ideas that can 
be presented and debated, and the apparent ability to mobilize support for those parties.  
What these examples, as well as many other similar inclusion stories, show is that 
democratization, or even a “gray zone”40 form of it, elections without democracy, is not 
totally doomed in the Middle East.  What must be understood is the fact that there are 
several significant political reasons that, as described above and including economics and 
cultural dynamics, can hinder the democratization process.  Democratization is not 
doomed in the Middle East, and only over time, through political learning, and steady 
forward progress can democratization truly be obtained and yield lasting positive results. 
4. Authoritarian Elites and Power in the Middle East 
Third, as stated earlier authoritarian rulers and elites do not want to give up their 
power.  This statement is deemed to be true and several scholars have a strong evidential 
basis for its explanation.  A justification for elites not giving up their power partially 
stems from the effects of the so called “resource curse” in the Middle East.41  As Michael 
Ross concluded, the resource curse, which contains the complementary casual 
mechanisms of the rentier effect, the repression effect, and the modernization effect, 
gives the authoritarian regimes and elites the opportunity, wealth, and power to protect 
their self-interests.42  Also, as Eva Bellin points out, international institutions contribute 
support in multiple ways to these authoritarian regimes to enable them to maintain power 
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and stability, and any type of change to these receiving elites, whether it be a change in 
regime power, polices, or politics, is unlikely while support still exists.43  Lastly, there 
are other several other reason why authoritarian regimes cling to their power starting 
from Bellin’s historical significance of patrimonial monarchies to M. Steven Fish’s male 
domination and Islamic religious traditions, specifically rigid female segregation, which 
both predominate the Middle East, even in the most secular regimes.44 
While wealth, power, greed, male domination, and historic tradition may be some 
of the selfish reasons why rulers and elites of authoritarian states want to keep their 
power, there also seems to be a somewhat arguable “legitimate” reason for this elite 
clutching of power.  As Eva Wegner points out, monarchs and presidents both want to 
achieve stabilization within their respective countries and a popular Islamist opponent 
could possibly throw off the balance of power within the political establishment or if 
elected, radically change the course of the country.45  This can clearly be seen in the 1979 
Iranian Islamic Revolution, when Khomeini, although not a professed Islamist, 
influenced much of the population and several powerful political entities in order to oust 
the Shah.  Since then, the people of Iran have become discouraged by the clerical 
restriction imposed upon them and the executive political power is and has been stagnate 
and fairly inadequate in promoting any change.46  The case study that “almost was” 
would have been the 1991 Islamist victory of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
party, but it is now a good example of the immense power of an authoritarian regime 
back by a dominant military force, effectively invalidating legal and popularly respected 
election results.47  Although the Algerian regime’s reasoning for annulling the elections 
and banning the FIS from participating in any future political processes can be argued 
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from several different angles, mainly personal interest, fear, or national stability, the 
result clearly supports the fact that repression of the opposition in such a visible way can 
lead to reradicalization of a moderating Islamist party and furthermore can be lead to the 
national instability they may have been attempting to avoid.48  So, by the very nature of 
this situation and situations like this, elites and authoritarian regimes are caught in a 
paradoxical quandary, and along those same line so are the Islamists. 
As Wegner, Wickham, and several other scholars have stated, authoritarian 
regime inclusion of Islamists parties in the political arena and moderation by those same 
Islamist parties is a primary and essential step in establishing regional and national 
stability in the Middle East.  The real question, as Mandaville points out, is how the 
authoritarian regimes, in the future, will deal with trying to balance the preservation of 
the “old guard privileges” and the demands of a young, politically aware, and 
“technologically savvy” generation that is already starting to stir the pot.49 
5. Are Middle Eastern Societies Trapped? 
Lastly, the statement that Middle Eastern societies are trapped between 
authoritarian elites and radical Islamist movements is also true.  The middle classes in 
this region feel that they have no real representation, either from the Islamists or from the 
ruling elites.  The majority of these middle class societies have been humiliated, 
colonized, victimized, and contained for many years.50  As stated in the previous sections 
above, Middle Eastern societies are caught in a vicious paradoxical battle between two 
forces.  On the one side the populous middle class societies have secular authoritarian 
regimes which are not willing to give up power for fear of losing wealth, power, or 
national stabilization, and as a consequence are forced to live in a repressive and stressful 
environment.  On the other side, those same citizens have a range of Islamists parties, 
from violent militant radicals to political and religious fundamentalist, within their 
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society who are not necessarily fighting for or defending their actual grievances and who 
promote or add to, whether consciously or unconsciously, the causes of national chaos, 
instability, and repression.  Inevitably in the Middle East, repression begets 
fundamentalism and fundamentalism begets repression.  So what is the solution?  Is it 
removal of the regimes and elites, or increased repression of the Islamists?  As Bellin 
concluded, violent removal of current oppressive regimes or devices will not ensure 
future democracy or stability, but in fact would only lead to a similar authoritarian regime 
with a different autocratic flavor or worse, national anarchy, and furthermore, as 
Mandaville conclude, increased repression would only continue to lead to increased 
radicalization and reradicalization.51 
Referring back to Mandaville’s question and answering how authoritarian regimes 
will deal with the preservation of the old guard and the demand of the young tech savvy 
youth is essential to finding a solution for these trapped Middle Eastern middle class 
societies.52  The fundamental solution to this pandemic crisis is addressing the difficulty 
of all a round true political legitimacy.  What does that mean?  It basically implies that 
the authoritarian regimes must first, institutionalize instrumental rules that are fair and 
remain as part of the political institution’s foundation, and second, find the right balance 
of political inclusion and eventual power sharing with moderating Islamist parties.53  For 
the Islamists, it means they must moderate themselves and adjust, take down a notch, 
their objectives and goals, and in some cases even modernize or find a balance with the 
standards of modern day society and even international trends to include the true 
grievances of the local middle classes.54  There is no doubt that there will be some 
authoritarian regimes and some Islamist parties that will have difficulty engaging in this  
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gargantuan challenge, but this is the only way Middle Eastern societies will be able to 
escape from the trap they are in and be relieved of their frustrations and feelings of 
misrepresentation.  
D. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND TERRORISM 
Ignatieff in his book The Lesser Evil observes that “terrorism is an offense not 
only against the lives and liberties of its specific victims, but against politics itself, 
against the practices of deliberations, compromise, and the search for nonviolent and 
reasonable solutions.”  How can democratic politics practice prevention of terrorism and 
counterterrorism without diminishing itself which is the very thing that terrorist seek? 
This is an example of another great paradox, quite similar to Dahl’s paradox of 
democracy and capitalism.  Here we find ourselves caught between defending freedom, 
democracy, and “our” way of life against those who threaten it, by means and actions that 
violate these same core values and principals we are trying to preserve and protect.  So 
can our “ends” (retaining our democracy) justify the “means” (liberty violations) by 
which we secure those ends?  This is a very difficult question to answer.  Critics would 
say there is never a time when human rights, and the like, should be violated.  On the 
other hand, there are groups who feel that there is a time and place when human rights 
can be suspended in order protect liberty.  We cannot sit back and allow the terrorist to 
fight by a different set of rules (i.e., no rules), and at the same time restrict the way we 
defend ourselves by binding our own hands.  Yet, we cannot push human rights 
suspensions so far as to risk playing the “game” with no rules for an indefinite period, 
thus becoming equally as wrong as the terrorists themselves. The fact is, we must walk 
along a very fine line in order not to lessen the very principals of our democracy, and at 
the same time we need to protect those principals from destruction. 
One of the main problems that governments face when dealing with terrorism is 
actually viewing the “other side” as a political entity.  Another main problem, as Ignatieff 
states, is that there are many forms of terrorism, insurrection, loner, liberation, separatist, 
occupation, and global, and that each must be dealt with differently.  In most cases  
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terrorists seek and resort to violence as a means of “communicating” their message, 
because they feel they have no other formal, legitimate, or recognized means of voicing 
their political opinion. 
As the definition of terrorism has been refined throughout the recent years, one 
thing has been constant, “terrorism is a violent form of politics.”55  Terrorism, in itself, 
contains four key ingredients, (1) it is an act of violence, (2) it has a political motive or 
goal, (3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons, and (4) it is staged to be played before 
an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result.56  Given this recipe for 
terrorism and the types of asymmetric tactics it uses, it is very difficult to find a truly 
effective counter to terrorism (wire taps, assignations, and interrogations) that does not 
violate or diminish democratic politics.   
So what is the answer?  The truth of the matter is that we must suspend our 
democratic politics on occasion, for limited amounts of time, and only when deemed 
absolutely critical, i.e., when our way of life is truly in jeopardy.  September 11, 2001 is 
an example of one of those times.  The answer to the main question is that democratic 
politics must be able to defend itself against the atrocities of terrorism with words and at 
times, if deemed necessary by leadership, and as a last resort, brute force (militarily,  
human right suspensions, and the like).  The key is that in order to protect ourselves from 
ourselves, we must institute rules and laws that will watch over the application of this 
“force” (i.e., Patriot Act, Sundown Laws, etc).   
A government cannot be expected to defend itself in a battle that is being fought 
unfairly, asymmetrically, unconventionally, and be expected to play by the conventional 
rules of war.  It would be impossible to win.  It can be perceived that the tactic of 
terrorism will never truly go away, and truth be told, there are very few cases where 
terrorism has prevailed in the long run.   We must as a society remember and understand 
this point, and in the mean time protect our liberties from theses types of aggressors with 
the means we deem necessary to be victorious.  Yet, still be cautious when we overstep 
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those set boundaries and begin violating our own human rights.  As Americans we must 
remember that in order to defeat terrorism and provide protection for our nation we may, 
when needed, and for limited amounts of time, violate the same principles we stand for.  
We must also trust our elected government officials to decipher the times when a 
suspension of rights is or is not deemed necessary. 
E. IS DIPLOMACY USEFUL WHEN CONFRONTING VIOLENT 
EXTREMIST GROUPS? 
The question above cannot be easily answered with a simple “yes” or “no” 
response.  First, there are all too many types of violent extremist groups (e.g., Al-Qaeda), 
and second, because diplomacy or negotiations, although the first “line of defense”57 
when dealing with sovereign states, is one of the last lines of defense when dealing with 
terrorists.  In order to get closer to answering the title question and because of the limited 
scope of this paper, I will focus on a specific type of non state foe, those identified as 
violent Islamic terrorists.  Second, it must be understood that this essay is not focusing on 
a literal definition of the word “diplomacy,” like the one stated by Hedley Bull, as “the 
conduct of relations between states and other with standing in world politics by official 
agents and by peaceful means.”58  Moreover, this essay will tend to use words like, 
coercive negotiation, defined by Patrick C. Bratton, as “the use of threats to influence 
another’s behavior,”59 vice using the pure word “diplomacy.”  The hypothesis of this 
essay is that diplomacy, negotiation, or coercion, can be used with certain violent Islamic 
terrorist organizations that meet a definite criteria.  The effectiveness of negotiations 
depends on whether or not terrorist organization have elements similar to actual 
sovereign states, specifically with respect to an organizational structure, political 
components, and realistic goals or objectives.  With that said, and as stated above there is 
no true “cookie cutter” solution or answer to the title question, because there is such a 
wide variety of terrorist entities around the world.  But by understanding the elements 
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state above; we can get closer to understanding whether or not diplomacy can be used 
with violent Islamic terrorist organization.  To get closer that answer, I will examine three 
different violent Islamic terrorist organizations with respect to the criteria and elements 
stated above, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which successfully repelled French 
colonization, Hamas, which has obtained political positions within Palestine but 
continues to use violence, and finally, Al-Qaeda, which has no political affiliation and 
continues to only use violence. 
1. The Difference between Dealing with State and Non State 
Organizations 
By nature, diplomacy is a very difficult instrument of nation power to wield when 
dealing with sovereign states, but is even more difficult when attempting to deal with 
violent Islamic terrorist non state organizations.  In the past, sovereign states like the U.S. 
and major world organizations like the U.N. have painstakingly implemented embargos 
and economic sanctions on “hostile” sovereign states, (for example, Trade Sanctions 
imposed on Iraq in the ‘90’s), in order to twist the arm of “hostile” state leaders.  
Countries like the U.S. and Iran have also used “Show of Force” or “Threat of Force” 
scare tactics, such as floating an Aircraft carrier off the coast of a hostile country or 
launching experimental long range test missiles (both of which are currently being 
demonstrated in the Arabian Gulf today), in order to prevent actions of “hostile” states.  
So, why do these tactics not work with non state terrorist organization like they can with 
sovereign state opponents? 
The difficultly faced when using instruments of national power on non state 
terrorist organizations is the fact that they may or may not be located altogether in any 
one particular location.  In some cases the terrorist organization may live among a neutral 
population that may or may not be sympathetic with an embedded terrorist group, or in 
another case they may live in several areas unknown to neutral host populations.  This 
implies that there may be no one specified country or area to in which to coerce or 
implement national power. 
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If we look at our three cases, we can start to see where these types of coercive 
negotiations or threats can and cannot be implemented.  In the case of FLN and Hamas 
we see two violent Islamic terrorist organizations that have somewhat defined locations, 
the FLN was mainly in Algeria and Hamas is mainly in Israel.  These two groups meet an 
element of the negotiation criteria, because having organizations that are somewhat 
centrally located (like a state) enables other sovereign states, in this case, France and 
Israel respectively, to implement forms national power (like diplomacy), on a centralized 
group.  On the other hand, Al-Qaeda’s organization fails to be located in any one 
particular state or region and is highly fractured (Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations 
around the world), therefore making it difficult to effectively implement any conventional 
form of national power, much less foster any type of diplomacy or negotiations.   
2. The Islamic Political Spectrum 
It is important to point out that, although not completely unique, violent Islamic 
terrorist organizations are sometimes stoutly connection to their religion.  In fact, for 
most Islamist groups there is no separation between church and state, or Islam and 
politics.60  The factor of religion in politics adds a degree of difficulty when dealing with 
any Islamic state’s political entity, but more so when dealing with a violent Islamic 
terrorist political entity.  With that said, along with having a centralized polis, there needs 
to be some sort of political entity in which to negotiate with, and that entity must be able 
to separate, even if only temporarily, religion from politics, in order to be successful. 
 If we look at the political Islamic spectrum (Figure 1), we will see that for 
Muslims, Islam (Shari’a Law, Qur’an, etc) is the source of politics. The political 
spectrum itself is then broken down from left to right, with reconcilers on the far left and 
rejectionists on the far right.  This basically illustrates that the more you move to the 
right, the more difficult it becomes to have successful “diplomatic” reconcile.61  Non 
state Islamist organizations that fall under headers such as Islamic Socialism, Liberalism, 
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and even Moderate Reformism, tend to have some form of rational and reconciling 
political entities within them, but as you approach the Islamic Right, rational reconcilers 
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Source: Dr. Jeffrey Bale, “Islamic Fundamentalism” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1.   Political Islamic Spectrum 
Given the above, there is still further division within the Islamic Right, see Figure 2, 
where Islamist organizations, although rejectionistic, are willing to negotiate, even if only 
temporarily.63  Even so, it is between the Gradual and Violent Islamists that we get closer 
to the tipping point of successful and unsuccessful negotiations.  Many gradual Islamist 
organizations are willing negotiate, because they are usually patient and able to separate 
the religious aspect from the political aspect, in order to achieve their objectives.64  It is 





                                                 
62 Dr. Jeffrey Bale, “Islamic Fundamentalism” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
April 15, 2008). 
63 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia Press 1977), 43. 
64 Dr. Jeffrey Bale, “Islamic Fundamentalism” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 






   ___________________________________________ 
   |                      | 
        Gradual         Violent  
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Source: Dr. Jeffrey Bale, “Islamic Fundamentalism” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 15, 2008) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2.   The Islamic Right Wing 
The Violent Islamic Right is more impatient than the Gradual Right, in that, 
groups within this category often use the art of violence to coerce their enemy into 
rapidly doing their will.  The FLN, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda all fall under the violent 
Islamic right terrorist category, but what makes them different?  Why have some violent 
terrorist organizations been willing to negotiate and while others have not? 
The fact is, within the violent wing of the Islamic Right there is a variable 
religious and political scale.  The FLN and Hamas on one end have a more political 
agenda and on the opposite end Al-Qaeda has more of a cosmic or religious agenda, and 
it is the division between these elements where negotiations truly begin or end.65  The 
example of this spectrum can be seen in Figure 3.  The FLN and Hamas created political 
wings, in order to promote negotiations, because their military tactics eventual gave way 
to discussing their somewhat political objectives.  Al-Qaeda is extremely violent and 
emanates both an extremely strong religious undertone and overtone.66  Because of Al-
Qaeda’s radical and strong religious beliefs and ineffective military advances, it has 
never formed a political wing and shows no indications of undertone and overtone.67   
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Figure 3.   The Violent Islamic Right Wing 
Because of Al-Qaeda’s radical and strong religious beliefs and ineffective military 
advances, it has never formed a political wing and shows no indications of doing so in the 
near future; in fact its leaders are opposed to negotiations, as stated in some of their 
literature.68  As we will discuss in the section below, objectives play a major role in the 
formation of political entities. 
3. Realistic and Unrealistic Objectives 
In the case of organizational objectives, some violent Islamic terrorist 
organizations have somewhat realistic and obtainable goals while others do not.  The 
FLN’s goal was to be relieved from French colonial occupation, a “near enemy,”69 and 
reinstate Algerian nationalism, which the FLN eventual accomplished.  Along the same 
lines, Hamas’ objective is the eradication of the Israelis, a “near enemy,”70 and the 
reestablishment of a Palestinian Islamic state.   Although, FLN’s and Hamas’ objectives 
were and are not easily obtainable, they are reasonable and not overly unrealistic. These 
objectives far differ from Al-Qaeda’s rather unfathomable transnational objective of 
defeating the “far enemy.”71  Al-Qaeda wishes to destroy the west and all those who have 
trespassed against Islam in order to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate. 72  As stated before, 
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Al-Qaeda is in a cosmic battle, which for them, leaves no room for negotiation.  
Islamists, like Al-Qaeda, at their very core, believe the world is divided into “dar-al-
Islam, the region of submission to the will of God, and dar-al-Harb, the region of war 
which has yet to be converted.”73  Basically they believe that the dar-al-Harb world is 
only temporary and will eventual be immersed or taken over by the dar-al-Islam.  In 
effect, it is the goal of Islamist to place the entire world living under an Islamic 
umbrella.74  Again, this objective is a rather unrealistic and unobtainable, which 
emphasizes the difficulty in negotiating with Al-Qaeda like factions.  
Although this section is by no means all encompassing, by briefly observing the 
cases of the FLN, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda, there poses some validity in stating that various 
violent terrorist organizations can have a form of negotiations, whether or not that form 
fits the true definition of “diplomacy” or not.  What distinguishes these terrorist groups, 
from one another in the diplomatic realm, is whether or not they contain elements that 
foster negotiation similar to actual sovereign states, specifically with respect to an 
organizational structure, a political component, and realistic goals or objectives.  The 
FLN is a good example of a non state foe negotiating with a sovereign state.  Even 
though the FLN had both religious and political elements, it was centralized, its 
motivation was mostly political and less religious, and its objectives were realistic.  To a 
lesser extent, Hamas is also an example of a non state foe negotiating with a sovereign 
state, because it is centralized, is more political than religious, and has goals that are not 
overly ambitious (although this is debatable).  It remains to be seen whether or not Hamas 
will be successful in the future.  On the opposite end, there are no negotiations with Al-
Qaeda, because it is severely decentralized, radiates extreme religious and fundamental 
overtones with no physical political entity, and has unrealistic and outrageous objectives 
(not debatable).75  Although this is not the main focus of this thesis, because terrorism 
has become more and more globalized, the answer to the title question, “can diplomacy 
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be use when confronting terrorist organizations?” is “yes,” but with the caveat that it can 
only be used with those terrorist organization that are willing to do so, and contain certain 
elements similar to true sovereign states. 
F. STRONG AND WEAK STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
On a per capita basis, the Middle East has the most heavily armed states in the 
world.  Yet instead of being considered ‘strong states’ because of that military power, 
most are viewed as quite weak, often not being able to get society to follow the rules the 
state makes.  What is behind this paradox in the Middle East? 
As pointed out by Joel Migdal, there are two arenas in which the state must 
engage in.  The first is that of the “world arena” or state to state relationships, 
(International Relations).76  The other arena is that of the state-society relationship, 
specifically the relationship between the populous of a country and the state apparatus 
which govern it.  Weak states, specifically those within the Middle East region, tend to 
give the illusion of strength and authority both in the international and domestic arena. 
The reality is that these states, in many cases, display military power and authority, but in 
most cases do not truly possess enough of either to effectively rule (enforce rules, 
positively direct economy, penetrate or direct social movements)  over the populous they 
are claiming to govern.  As some scholars have described (see Roger Owen), and Migdal 
expressed in his book Strong Societies and Weak States, the problem with weak states 
rests within the relationship the between the state leadership and the society in which it 
governs.77  Leadership within weak states tend to be powerless to the changes which 
occur in their societies,  changes which have a propensity to occur regardless of 
attempted state interference in such transformations.78  Weak states display certain 
tendencies and usually exhibit an inability to infiltrate the society within its boarders, to 
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mobilize support, to adjust social interactions, and to control and employ resources.79  
The paradox rests within the reasons why this impedance occurs in weak states of the 
Middle East. 
Migdal also points out that to overcome these shortfalls in governance, weak state 
must “become the constant and formidable presence even in the most remote villages.”80  
This is problematic, because it is at this point weak states in the Middle East tend to 
become entangled in a paradox which precludes them from become strong states.  To 
have a formidable presence within these societies, states must create strong and capable 
agencies and local bureaucracies with resources capable of enabling them to carry out the 
state leadership’s decrees, laws, etc.81  The threat to senior leadership within weak 
regimes is that if these types of state established agencies and or local bureaucrats have 
too much of a power base or too much influence to mobilize enough resources and people 
on their own, they could eventually become a threat to the senior leaders of the state.  The 
fear of these senior leaders is that those power bases could enact a coup d'état or start a 
revolution and overthrow their government.82  Therefore, weak state regime leadership 
within Middle Eastern states tend to use coercive mechanism (e.g., shuffling of 
leadership position, loyalty appointments versus merit appointments, overlapping 
bureaucratic functions) to prevent this type of power gain from happening, thereby 
weakening their own representatives, and in effect weakening their own ability to govern 
their societies at the same time. 
Whether a state is strong or weak can be summed up by defining the relationship 
between the state agencies (the state) and its relationship with the society (the populous) 
it has authority over.  Although military might and power are measured aspects of strong 
or weak states, from an international perspective, it is clearly not the only defining factor 
taken into consideration when determining that state’s internal governance status.  To 
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explain this paradox, there must first be an understanding of what exactly it means to be a 
strong state and what it means to be a weak state.  A strong state, as defined by Joel 
Migdal, is one which is “at center stage, kneading society into new forms and shapes, 
adapting it to the exigencies created by industrialization or other stimuli.”83  In other 
words, the societies in which the state has authority over are governed by a single set of 
“rules” and regulations set forth by the state, enforced by state representatives, and 
implemented by local level bureaucrats, who tend to be co-located within those societies, 
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Figure 4.   The Strong State 
The measurement of success then presented is whether or not those societies, 
within the state’s sphere of influence, tend to follow the set of rules set forth by the state 
or whether they chose or are coerced into following a different set of rules determined 
and enforced by a different non-state agency (i.e., tribe, family, or other organization). 
This brings us to the definition of a weak state.  The structure of the society in a 
weak state differs mainly at the local level, although not always the case.  What generally 
ends up happening in a weak state is that lower level bureaucrats, or the state rule 
implementers, tend to compete with non-state affiliated formal or informal organizations, 
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agencies, tribes, and families, otherwise known as “strongmen,” for authority over 
societies at the local level.85  These strongmen tend to be seen as the dominant force 
within the area, and usually offer protection, control resources, and enforce their set of 
rules and laws.  The society itself is basically caught between choosing between obeying 
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Figure 5.   The Weak State 
The delineation between the weak state and the strong state can partially be 
determined by the amount of resources put forth by the state towards its enforcement 
capabilities and agencies.  A strong state will provide the local level implementers with 
the appropriate resources and authority necessary for that state agency to execute the state 
rules and regulations (i.e., laws), using coercive means when and if necessary.86  
Furthermore and most importantly, in a strong state, the state and its representative 
agency are seen as the single source for the rule of law and are dominant over and trump 
all other organizations, clans, families, and tribes within the state. 
Why the paradox then?  As stated above, in order to be a strong state, local 
leadership must have the tools and have effective state representative agencies at the local 
societal level, in effect, allowing the state apparatus to penetrate and influence its citizen 
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at the lowest levels of society (i.e., the individual). What has happened in the Middle East 
is that many states, like Iraq (pre-U.S. war), Libya, and Yemen for example, which are 
considered to be “weak” states tend to rule from “bunkers,” as Clement Henry and Robert 
Springborg state in their book Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East.87   The leaders in these types of countries are not necessarily fearful of other 
states, but tend to be more fearful of their own populations.  These leaders are afraid that 
any agency which is given too much power is bound to mobilize and rise up against 
them. What has happened in these states is that leadership has created agencies to carry 
out its will and enforce laws and regulations, but there are several problems.  First, the 
agencies that are meant to carry out and enforce the laws of the state are purposely 
hamstrung by their limited resources and authority.  These agencies have been made 
virtually powerless through “overlapping functions” so that no one agency is given total 
power.  Second, those same agencies are pitted against each other to either fight for 
resources or what little power they are actually given.  This creates distrust and disloyalty 
among agencies and can create alliances against those agencies which may be seen as 
gaining too much power (a balance of power).  Third, leadership in these state tend to use 
non-merit appointments to place or assign personnel, who have demonstrated regime 
loyalty, in places of management in order to prevent counter loyalties from forming.  
Eventually, usually when they feel threatened, the state then shifts those same selected 
leaders from position to position, sometime regardless of experience or skill, in order to 
prevent then from establishing power bases in those areas and position.  Finally, if worst 
comes to worst, state leadership can simply resort to plainly removing (eliminating) any 
agency leadership it perceives as a threat, normally without cause. 
Because of this type of state leadership paranoia, governance at the local level is 
weak at best.  The populous in these types of communities look to the dominant 
leadership agency whether it is state run or non-state affiliated (i.e., tribe, family, clan, 
gang) to provide them with their basic needs of security and stability.  Therefore, at the 
local societal level, the populous must choose who to follow.  Although they can and 
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many times are forced to follow the “biggest dog on the block,” they must follow that 
agency’s or organization’s set of rules, and many times those rules or laws conflict, e.g., 
the difference between tribal law and state law.  This is where the strongmen, or local 
non-state organizations or agencies (the tribe, family, and industrial enterprise) come into 
play.  Because of the weakness of local bureaucracy (limited power and/or resources), 
these strongmen agencies tend to fill the created leadership void left by local bureaucrats.  
These strongmen are usually local, well-established in the community, and well-known 
by the people, unlike that of the state appointed local bureaucrats.88  The strongmen tend 
to be in control of many, if not, most of the valuable and profitable resources within their 
communities.89 
The answer, as some weak states have resorted to, would be for leaders to use the 
state’s military prowess to crack down on these types of strongmen at the local level.  
The problem lies in the fact that the type of military presence and the amounts of 
resources needed to suppress this type of local level strongman activity would be 
overwhelming, costly, and virtually impossible to implement everywhere, at the same 
time.  The limited power given to the local bureaucrats and enforcers is not enough, in 
many cases, to thwart the strongmen, especially in rural areas.  It is obvious from an 
outside perspective, that if more power and resources were given to local state 
representatives, if less shifting of state agency leadership and expertise took place, and if 
there was a abolishment of overlapping bureaucratic functions that states, which 
employed these power shifting tactics, would intuitively become more stable and more 
secure.  Is it possible that the perceived risk (coup d'état, death, etc) is truly too high for 
leaders in the Middle East to ever change their tactics?   
The bottom line is that due to many Middle Eastern regime fears of being 
overthrown or dismissed by the very agencies they have appointed within their own state, 
they have constrained those same agencies and therefore created weak bureaucratic 
leadership at the local levels of their societies.  The weakness has led to the fragmentation 
of the social structures within the state, and consequently limited their ability to rule over 
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and enforce their own rules of law, “penetrate their society, regulate social relationships, 
extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”90  Although, the 
validity of being overthrowing is an obvious reality for Middle Eastern state leaders, 
those same leaders will continue to be encased within this paradox until they can break 
through that same fear.  Consequently, if this breakthrough does not occur, these weak 
states will continue to be fearful of their own societies and will most likely continue to 
hamstring local state agencies thereby bestowing local power to strongmen, fragmenting 
their societies, and remaining weak states. 
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IV. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON MIDDLE EAST 
ECONOMICS 
A. ECONOMICS AND GLOBALIZATION 
Today, Islam is the second largest religion in the world with a total of about 1.3 
billion people, thus constituting approximately 21.1 percent of the world’s religious 
followers, see Figure 6.91  With this information in hand, questions begin to formulate 
about where Islam and the Muslim people stand in the world market hierarchy, and where 
they might be in the future?  Below are some of the postulations that have surfaced 
throughout the scholarly world. 
Does religion by itself affect economic growth or status?  Specifically, does the 
Islamic faith affect the economic growth process of a country?  Does Islam as a religion 
bleed over into the nation-state affairs of a country, i.e., an “Islamic” state?  How do 
predominantly Muslim countries fare economically?  Does the percentage of Muslim 
followers in a country affect that country’s economic status and/or growth?  Do Islamic 
beliefs hold back economic progress?  Does Islam get along with Capitalism?  Can Islam 
be adapted to the modern world, and if so, how fast?  Is Islam holding its people back 
from getting on the globalization train?  Will the Islamic faith and its followers continue 
to grow or begin to fade in the near or distant future?  As my research will show, these 
questions are not new or unique, but are examples of the many questions being asked and 
studied by scholars today. 
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Figure 6.   Top Ten World Religions 
Note: Mid 2004 data was used due to its consistency among multiple sources.  Figures of 2007 and earlier 
show similar values and percentages.  Figure 1 is a representation of the relative population of the Islamic 
religion throughout the world.  This Chart includes only organized religions and excludes more loosely 
defined groups such as Chinese or African traditional religions. 
 
 Source: Infoplease.com, s.v. “Top Ten Organized Religions of the World,” 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904108.html (Accessed March 4, 2008). 
 
B. MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMICS 
This chapter approaches the study of Middle Eastern economics from several 
different perspectives by looking at the Middle East economy as a whole, by using case 
analysis, and comparative data analysis of a country’s historical GDP and Globalization 
Index relative to a country’s Muslim population percentage.  The idea for this analysis 
came from Frederic Prior’s 2006 essay on “The Economic Impact of Islam on 
Developing Countries.”  Prior’s study focused on developing countries only and he used 
data from 2000 to perform his analysis.  He stated “that the presence of Islam has 
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relatively little influence on most economic or social performance indicators” and that in 
“Muslim economies, religion does not appear to be a useful explanatory variable.”92  
Again, he only focused on developing countries with majority Muslim populations, but 
the following analysis section broadens that examination.  It was important to compare all 
countries in order to get a holistic or global view of this “Muslim Variable” or as I would 
like to coin it, “The Muslim Effect.”  The goal here was to see what kind of results or 
answers could be concluded by conducting simple comparisons of Muslim populations 
throughout the world and measurable world productivity data (GDP, Globalization 
Index). 
C. MUSLIMS ECONOMICS 
As stated in the previous sections and chapters, the Islamic faith plays a 
significant role in the lives of the Muslim people.  The Qur’ān, Hadith, Qiyas, Ijmā, and 
Ijtihad all affect the daily lives of billions of Muslims every day, just visit any of the 
major Ayatollah’s Question & Answer website section.  The practices, teachings and 
laws (Shari’a law and jurisprudence) that are provided by these life directing sources can 
and do have limitations on many different levels, and many eventually have an effect 
(either direct or indirect) on the economic realm.  Pryor mentions these limitations in his 
essay, and Hourani and Esposito define them in their books.93  For example, there are 
direct economic limitations that prohibit the paying or accepting interest (ribā), 
prohibition of investing in chancy industry business enterprises, and the a “redistribution” 
of earnings through the well known zakat and khum, which is short for distributions of 
charitable donations.  These limitations are not absolute, but obviously affect countries 
with large populations of Muslims (mainly with Muslim majority (>50%) populations).  
Countries with larger Muslim populations tend to be more effected by the binding 
economical limitations and laws, fatwas or legal judgment of a senior or Islamic 
specialist, and the opinions of local fundamentalist.  So, are Muslims finding ways 
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around the Islamic Law (Shari’a) because they want to be successful and be afforded the 
ability to compete in the global market?  The assumption is yes. 
D. DEMOCRACY TO CAPITALISM 
Robert Dahl observes that political democracy and market-capitalism have a 
curious relationship.  On the one hand, they support each other, whereas on the other 
hand, they modify and limit each other.  This section critiques this interdependence 
between political democracy and market capitalism, and looks at  why Muslims need to 
embrace Democracy and Capitalism together, and attempts to highlight why they can’t 
have one without the other, because of the true interdependence. 
Democracy itself is dependent on the successful practice of market capitalism 
within its resident society, and at the same time market capitalism, itself, is dependent on 
the successful practice of democracy.   Dahl points out that although this connection is an 
“I need you and you need me” type relationship, it is also a relationship that involves 
volatile balancing act of opposing forces, in a fight for a “balance of influence.”  Market 
capitalism is supported by Democracy through its government regulation.  The same 
government regulation (the government’s power to regulate), and balance thereof, 
continuously threatens the markets existence.  Democracy needs market capitalism to 
survive, because of the positive influence and impact it has on the polis.  So if 
Democracy over-influences the free market, hence destroying its true nature, it will 
inevitably destroy the life blood if democracy itself.  Dahl’s paradox that, “a market-
capitalist economy inevitably generates inequalities in the political resources to which 
different citizens have access”94, is true.  Without market capitalism democracy itself 
would be at risk and without democracy capitalism would be at risk.  Certainly both want 
and need each other, but they are locked in a permanent and sensitive balancing act 
attempting not to tip the scale too much one way or the other.  There seems to be no relief 
in the future to the pressure between these two forces, so we should have a basic 
understanding of what exactly keeps them fighting and at the same time what exactly 
keeps them together. 
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1. I Need You, You Need Me 
Why do they need each other?  Why does democracy need market capitalism, and 
why does market capitalism need democracy?  As Dahl states, “market capitalism favors 
democracy because of its social and political consequences.”95 Basically, market 
capitalism promotes the economical growth of a population which in turn is a promotion 
and a foundation for democracy.  Economical growth leads to increased wealth, 
education, and people with jobs at all levels, in effect, a creation of middle class society.  
It is that same society that promotes democracy and provides the air for its existence.  An 
economy which is not centralized provides opportunities for its citizens to become 
independent, which is constructive for democracy.  Democracy provides, ideally in a non 
centralized way, the laws and regulations by which the market itself runs.  This is done 
by creating policies and laws to discouraging monopolies and to protect and enforce 
people’s rights.96  In other words, the democratic government must at times step-in in 
order to protect the citizens from themselves or harmful market practices.  This is tricky, 
because in a sense this “step-in” is contrary to the free market concept, and can lead to 
both the demise of the market and that of itself, if the government “steps-in” too far.  This 
leads us to why market capitalism and Democracy oppose each other. 
2. Balancing the Power of Influence 
Why do they fight each other?  Why does market capitalism threaten democracy, 
and why does democracy threaten market capitalism?  Basically, for the same reasons 
market capitalism and democracy need each other, described above.  The case still stands 
that a market economy can never truly be self regulating, and there has never been a 
democracy that did not extensively regulate a free market.97  The power, through 
democratic means, to effect these regulations of the market can and eventually does lead 
to corruption in the democratic process, political inequality, hence thwarting democracy.  
Special interest groups and large corporations (mainly of the free market) fund this type 
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of coercion, corruption, directed political agendas, false advertisements, and misguided 
information.  Some politicians have been guilty of taking bribes (political resources) for 
their votes and supported regulations and laws which led to gains (profits) for the self 
interest of the companies, but at the same time were harmful to people those politicians 
should have been protecting.  This has been proven true in the U.S. and among other 
countries, on many occasions.  Dahl states that “unequal ownership and control of major 
economic enterprises in turn contribute massively to the inequality in political resources . 
. . and thus to extensive violations of political equality among democratic citizens.”98  In 
a sense, the elites of society threaten the point of disguising an Oligarchy as a 
Democracy. The free market will not last under a false Democracy, and hence is doomed 
to fail. 
So, the paradox stands.  Democracy has an affect on market capitalism and 
market capitalism has an affect on democracy and there is truly no end.  The fate of one 
entity depends solely on the success or failure of the other. 
E. WHY HAVE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIES NOT DIVERSIFIED? 
There are several reasons why Middle East economies have not diversified, 
because this paper is limited in size, its scope will be limited to several generalizations 
about the Middle East, which do not always necessarily speak to all of the individual 
states, but rather to a majority of them. 
At first glance, one could assume the reason why the Middle East has not 
diversified is due to the fact that countries in the Middle East inhabit some of the hottest, 
driest, and limited arable land in the world and secondly that they sit on the some of the 
largest known oil reserves in the world.  It could be a plausible case that, even with the 
limited of quantity of so many other resources, the abundance of hydrocarbons, and the 
enormous rents and revenues they have generated for the region, have given the Middle 
East insufficient, if any, motivation to make investments in any other industry.99  This 
assessment has some truth to it, but only part of the answer. 
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To begin, much of the Middle East has been defensive towards economic 
diversification as subset of globalization, mainly due to the actions and effects of the 
political elites within the region, who are bent on retaining their ruling power. 100  The net 
effect is that authoritarians, praetorian regimes, and select elites have exploited and 
controlled just about every facet of the countries in which they govern or have influence 
on, focusing unquantifiable national assets on personal gain, security system, and militant 
devices to aid in their governance.101  Consequently, their economies have paid a 
considerable price and lost out on numerous years of foreign investment, human capital 
development, and infrastructure development, all of which would have assisted in the 
diversification process.102  These consequences are the underlying reasons why the 
Middle East in general has not particularly diversified and led to the main causes of 
diversification resistance. 
First, one of the major diversifying weaknesses of the Middle East is its 
development of the private sector.  As most economic scholars would suggest, successful 
integration of a country’s private sector into the national economy is essential to 
economic reform and success.103  This is not to say that all counties in the Middle East 
region have necessarily discouraged their private sectors from flourishing, rich oil 
producers like Saudi Arabia, which makes up about half of the entire private sector in the 
GCC, have in fact encouraged it. 104  Overall, smaller oil producer and non-oil producer 
regimes in the Middle East lack in this area.  This deficiency in privatization is mainly 
due to costly start up fees, lengthy and complex start up processes, corruption, and 
accounts of cronyism. 
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Second, those countries, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, which have 
attempted to diversify or reform their economic developmental policies, and mirror plans 
like the Washington Consensus no less, have inevitably failed to reach any significant 
benefits to prove its success.105  Hence little incentive has been provided by a Middle 
East “success story” to inspire other Middle East countries to follow in their footsteps.106  
With that being said, the oil producers continue to rely heavily on the oil rents to 
supplement their economies and like wise the non-oil producers continue to rely of the 
remittances received from those same oil producers. 
Overall, the failure to diversify has been failure of the Middle East regime leaders 
to place the state over personal gains and agendas, invest in and truly foster private 
sectors, and look beyond the “oil” status quo.  In effect, they have been nurtured by their 
contentment of oil and gas rents, revenues, and remittances from the abundance and 
success of the global hydrocarbon market. 
In what ways has hydrocarbon dependence structured economic and political 
relationships between the countries of the region?  The hydrocarbon dependence has 
strengthened and weakened economic and political relationships between the countries of 
the Middle East region.  There are two main distinctive relationships which can be seen 
in the Middle East.  The first is the relationship among the major petroleum producers in 
the region.  The second and more involved relationship is the one between the regional 
petroleum producers/labor importers (oil-rich) and non-petroleum/labor exporters (oil-
poor).  Because of it complexity, the later relationship will be the main focus of this 
portion of the essay.107 
These relationships can also be viewed from two different perspectives.  One 
perspective is that hydrocarbon dependence is bringing Middle East countries together, 
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and the other perspective is just the opposite, that hydrocarbon dependence in the region 
is driving them apart.  There is evidence of both. 
Although the relationship between the oil-rich and oil poor countries is a complex 
one, and one in which the region’s dependence on oil has made the relationship even 
more complicated, evidence to support the argument that the hydrocarbon dependence is 
binging these countries together is fairly transparent.108  First, there is the simple 
economic relationship between these states which involves oil-rich countries providing 
direct and indirect budget subsides to neighboring oil-poor countries.109  In return, the 
oil-rich have expected but not necessarily received some form of political return.110  
Second, oil-poor countries receive remittance revenue by providing human labor to the 
oil-rich countries.111  Labor migration in itself has altered the political economy in the 
Middle East.112  The result is cheap labor for the oil rich countries and remittances for the 
oil poor countries.113  In both of these relationships, oil-poor countries see themselves 
politically fused to oil-rich countries, and although the economic and political 
commitment may at times seem two-way, there tends to be less commitment from the oil-
rich countries, which see more benefit in associating themselves to more significant 
hydrocarbon-utilizing states (U.S., China, etc), than to oil-poor countries.114 
In a similar fashion, evidence to support the argument that the hydrocarbon 
dependence is dividing these countries is of a comparable transparent nature, and equally 
important because of its effect on underlying regional relations.  Two examples of this 
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divide are the widening wealth divide between the oil-rich and oil-poor countries of the 
Middle East and a condition known as “Arabization.”115    
First, the slow and threaten shift in the region’s balance of power, which began 
after the discovery oil, led older oil-poor to quickly fall behind the new found oil-rich.116  
In effect, while the older oil-poor and ridged countries either wasted economic 
opportunities or invested in bad ones, the oil-rich made extensive and successful 
economic gains through steps and eventually leaps towards globalization.  The outcome 
was that wealth in the oil-rich countries continuously bread wealth, which in turn 
increased the chances for even more wealth.117  With that being said, oil-rich countries 
have attempted to promote more regional cooperation, which in effect would increase 
regional interdependence, yet oil-poor countries have declined cooperative efforts for fear 
that the increased interdependence would diminish their power and influence within the 
region, which has paradoxically declined because of that unwillingness.118 
The second example of regional division may be less obvious than the first, but no 
less a product of regional hydrocarbon dependence.  For a regional which is rich in 
history and tradition, culture has always played a significant role in the lives of just about 
every Middle East citizen.  “Arabization,” or nationalization of Arab workforces, and 
“De-Arabization,” or the loss of Arab national identity, have become unspoken points of 
contention with both political and economic ramifications for both Middle East oil-rich 
and oil poor countries.119  As labor migration has benefited both oil-rich and oil-poor 
countries and increased cohesiveness, it has also paradoxically driven them apart.  Fear of 
De-Arabization, which has actually been felt by and caused controversy on both sides,  
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has provoked oil rich counties to promote ideas like “Saudization,” “Omanization,” and 
“Emiratization,” as sub-form examples of Arabization, in order to protect oil-rich Arab 
cultures from external influences, but also to protect Arab oil-rich labor and jobs.120  
Policies such as reserving professions “for citizen only”, enforcement of employment 
quotas for local Arabs, and a host of other initiatives (allowing women to drive 
themselves, private schooling for indigenous Arabs, wage subsidies for blue-collar and 
white collar jobs) have been advertised in order to decrease the need for foreign 
workers.121  This has obviously been seen as a threat to oil-poor country’s labor 
migration and in effect vital remittances, which inevitably cause political and economic 
difficulty throughout the region. 
F. IS THE MIDDLE EAST AT A TIPPING POINT? 
The central economic challenge confronting the Arab world today is how 
to provide employment for the large numbers of young people entering the 
labor force. 
Noland and Pack Arab Economies at a Tipping Point 
The “tipping point” which Noland and Pack describe, is essentially the critical 
point at which the Arab economy, as a whole, finds itself today.  There is no doubt the 
Arab region is currently, at least on the surface, in a period of accelerated economic gain, 
but what is the outlook of its future?  As Noland and Pack explain, the region has some 
serious thinking to do and decisions to make.  High energy prices have given the Arab 
region increased wealth, more jobs have been created, and employment is better, but the 
region as a whole still has one of the world’s highest unemployment rates overall.  The 
Arab region is presently sitting on a powder keg of educated yet unemployed generation 
of young Arabs, who are quickly approaching their prime productive working years.  
Current high energy prices have provided adequate rents and profits which have aided in 
keeping the lid on this powder keg and fostering the Arab economy at the same time.  At 
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first glance, the Arab economy looks as if it may continue on a path of apparent 
prosperity, but for how long?  What happens if and when the price and demand for oil 
unexpectedly go into a continuous downward spiral? 
The argument by scholars like Noland and Pack is that leaders of Arab Economies 
have not been as forward thinking as they should be.  There is no doubt they have been 
investing in their region’s future, but most investments have been linked back to the oil 
sector (oil refining).  In addition, the industries they have invested in are many automated 
industries (fertilizer and aluminum smelting) and unfortunately not in the future job 
creating sectors such as global technologies and globally manufactured exports.  
Furthermore, petrodollar recycling has taken place within the region in other areas such 
as interregional real estate and tourism investments, which again are not tradable sectors.  
Either way, investments in these areas will do little to help derive global market sectors 
and produce the much needed job market and industrial environment needed if such a 
downturn takes place in the future 
1. Are Arab Economies at a Tipping Point? 
Unequivocally, the answer is yes.  The question which leaders in Arab Economies 
need to answer is what happens from here?  The situation which Noland and Pack, the 
World Bank, and others have described is that essentially the future prices of 
hydrocarbons and other nonrenewable energy sources is unknown, and arguably it is an 
extremely volatile market.  Current Arab prosperity caused by the “economic energy 
boom” has given Arab Economies the chance to anticipate and create financial 
opportunities which would help them to continue on a prosperous track.  The decision the 
Arab region needs to make is whether or not it will take full advantage of this windfall 
and prepare its population for the competitive global economic environment they will 
face after the boom has ended.  The Arab economy as a whole is facing two distinctly 
different paths, and the region must make a decision on which way it will go. 
A turn in a direction leading toward increased poverty, discontent, militancy, and 
repression will be the dreadful path taken if economic gaps between the Arab world and 
the industrial world are not closed, if global manufacturing of exports and technological 
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innovations are not fostered, and if the most important issue of creating a quality global 
job market is not solved.  To avoid this horrific path, successfully addressing these issues 
through a range of economic and government reforms and political policy changes is a 
must. 
2. Can We Speak of Arab Economies as a Whole? 
Yes, we can speak of Arab Economies as a whole, if we acknowledge the fact that 
the Arab Economies, as a whole, have revolve around oil and energy production.  Also, 
that the increase in energy prices has had both positive and negative implications for both 
the oil and non-oil producing countries in the region, especially with respect to the 
downbeat repercussions on the regional job market, employment, and unemployment.  As 
Noland and Pack stated the “Dutch disease” has affected both the oil and non-oil 
producers in the Arab region.  The young educated people within the oil producing 
countries have grown up in a system which offers a limited job market, allows them to 
maintain an unemployed status with little or no negative implications, or forces them to 
seek higher level employment outside the region where their knowledge can be 
appreciated and utilized more productively.  Non-oil producers, by the same token, have 
incurred a strain on their labor markets because the wages earned by laborers outside 
their resident countries and within the oil producing ones far exceed anything offered at 
home.  Local employers and industries within the non producing countries consequently 
are not able to hire labor with what would normally be considered a standard rate wages 
due to the competitively higher rates offered abroad.  Furthermore, development in global 
markets has lagged in these countries as well, due to direct or indirect “spillover effects” 
from oil producing countries’ shaky political policies, authoritarian regime motivations, 
and regional instability.  In turn, this has affected their migration flow or indigenous labor 
force, and foreign and local investments in the advancement of global market exports. 
If we look at the Arab economy as a whole in its current state, with energy prices 
on the rise, prospects are good for the region.  If and when those same energy prices fall, 
or new energy technologies arise outside the region, it could mean doom for the Arab 
Economy.  With the core income of their economy gone what would they fall back on?  
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As discussed earlier, the region is weak in global technology and globally manufactured 
exports.  If the volatile floor of the energy market were to collapse from underneath them, 
the “Arab economy” as we know it would cease to exist.  Individual countries and 
governments would find themselves stressing to find new sectors in which they could be 
competitive in and would eventually have to face the microeconomic issues (lack of 
globalization, technological innovation, and the “brain drain”) they have neglected.  
These economies would find it difficult and hard to adjust to such an economic change 
given their inadequate preparation of such an event. 
There is no doubt that the economies of the Arab region are interconnected 
between the “resource-rich, labor-importing” and the “resource-poor, labor abundant 
countries.”  If we look at the Arab Economies as a whole, the solution to avoiding the 
above crisis is to thoughtfully allocate the oil fund windfall into global market sectors 
that will benefit not only the oil producers, but the non oil producers as well.  
Additionally, government and political reforms must take place in the powerful and 
resource rich Arab countries so that the “spillover effect” of economic polices can work 
across the boarders and have a positive affect across the region, and hopefully as regional 
stability increases, economic growth and development would increase as well. 
G. CASE STUDY: COMPARING AND CONTRASTING HOW SAUDI 
ARABIA AND QATAR HAVE DEALT WITH THE THREATS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION.  
As with several of the counties within the MENA region and specifically among 
the Gulf Cooperation Counsel (GCC) states, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have adopted a 
combination of elements from different development models.  For the most part, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar have both sought to implement the oil-export-led growth model, 
because oil is an important natural resource which both of these countries have an 
abundance of.  Although Saudi Arabia with its plausible ownership of approximately 
one-fifth of the petroleum on the globe is an exception compared to the rest of the GCC, 
both countries have adopted and implement this developmental policy.122  According to 
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this model, the original goal of these two countries should be to attain enough revenue 
from oil exports to eventual build an industrial base that, in the event that their natural 
resources run dry, would be able to support and sustain their counties in the future.   
The goal of export-led growth dovetails into the second developmental policy 
which Saudi Arabia and Qatar have attempted to implement, that of import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI).  Although the oil-export-led growth model has been the 
foundational model for many years following the discovery and exploitation of Middle 
Eastern oil, Saudi Arabia and Qatar painfully learned, or so it seemed, the lesson of 
depending on a single export when they realized the 1970’s oil boom was just that, only a 
boom.  They eventually realized their export revenues were very volatile and “highly 
dependent on oil price developments.”123  In effect, Saudi Arabia and eventually Qatar 
saw the need to diversify and branch out into other economically viable sectors, and 
hence they began to adopt elements of the ISI model.  The difference here is that Saudi 
Arabia with many superior advantages (land, labor, and capital) compared to Qatar has 
been able to implement the ISI model more successfully, and mainly in the areas of 
fertilizers and petroleum.  So, it is with the elements of ISI model that we begin to see a 
significant difference between the economies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and realize the 
size does matter. 
Additionally, although not as explicit, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have, over the past 
few years and especially after the 1970’s oil boom, made social-economic changes and 
adopted some of the elements of the Washington Consensus mainly in the areas of 
foreign investment and budgeted “priority to primary health, education, and infrastructure 
investments.”124  Again, we can see differences in each country’s ability to adopt and 
implement changes within the government and economy.  If we look to the relative size 
of the country, Qatar has the advantage in this respect, because as a relatively smaller 
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country it tends to run and operate more like a large business, and therefore compared to 
Saudi Arabia is able to make and implement decisions faster and react to changes in the 
economy quicker.  In a similar fashion, Qatar although arguably more liberal than Saudi 
Arabia, witness the Al-Jazeera network, tends to be more flexible in its policies and 
therefore able to flex to more international ideas like the Washington Consensus. 
1. Domestic, Regional and International Factors which Induced the 
Selection of this Combination of Models 
As describe in the earlier question, the obvious answer lies within the discovery, 
want, and need for oil globally, the abundance of that oil, and the limited non-petroleum 
resources available in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and not to be forgotten the nature of these 
regimes which survived imperialism in the wake of the post colonial era.  Still, there is no 
doubt that the discovery of abundant oil reserves allowed these two countries to easily 
slip into the export-led growth model managed by a monarchy and authoritarian 
government.  Over time and as events like the 1970’s Oil boom and the following oil 
decline, as well as an actual and perceived instability in the MENA region caused these 
countries to begin the process of adopting elements of the ISI model in addition to the 
export model.  Furthermore, pressures from western petroleum consumers eventually 
encourage and persuaded Saudi Arabia and Qatar both with “concentrated finical 
systems” to further diversify their developmental models to include the adoption of some 
elements of the Washington Consensus.125 
2. Opposition to Models within Saudi Arabia and Qatar  
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not necessarily had to contend with an immense 
amount of opposition to their combined or mixed developmental models per se.  
Opposition if any has mainly come from extern pressure to either further adapt to the ISI 
or Washington Consensus models in preparation of perceived eventual downturn in the 
global market for oil or the physical evaporation of their oil reserves. 
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Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s internal opposition can be view from two points of 
view.  From one point, we can look at the social welfare system in either nation, and see 
that its robustness has and will continue to persuade the indigenous populous to maintain 
the status quo.  As long as adequate welfare checks continue to support their lifestyle, 
they will continue to be happy.  The perceived problem with this scenario is obvious, if 
the checks stop coming as the government eventual goes into debt due to a downturn in 
the oil market, there will more than like be civil unrest and the populous will have little 
experience to get it going again.  But until this happens, presumably there will be little 
opposition to either the development models or to the political structure of either county.  
Furthermore, the current GDP per capita (Saudi Arabia’s GDP per capita ~$23,000 and 
Qatar’s GDP per capita is ~$87,000 and one of the highest in the world) of either country 
is nothing to scoff at and this represents the capital influence of the oil export model on 
the populous pocketbooks.126  
From another view, opposition to the combined models, but maybe more so 
toward the type of governance, which could eventual gain some ground, is in the limiting 
of privatizing numerous sectors in the many finical and industrial sectors of the economy.  
Furthermore, reform request in several others areas include the problems with 
privatization of certain public sectors of the economy and a move away from indigenous 
labor forces clogging up the public and governmental job sector.127  As it stands today, 
there is a blurry line between what is private and what is public in these two countries.128  
Although many of Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s principle businesses do well within the 
realm of a globalized world, an additional private sector could possibly increase and 
eventual supplement their already booming export based economy in the long run.129  If  
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and when the oil export model begins to turn sour for these two countries due to a down 
turn on the oil market, and presumably Qatar will be affected first, it is more likely that 
opposition forces to the oil export model will rise. 
3. Weaknesses of Models 
The problem with the selection of the export-led growth model is that both Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar are limited in their non-petroleum resources and therefore limited in 
creating secondary sustainable industrial based economy.  Comparatively and due to its 
inadequate land mass, Qatar with 4,416 square miles is much more limited in this 
perspective than that of Saudi Arabia with 830,000 square miles.130  Similar, Qatar is 
limited in arable land, water, and population compared to Saudi Arabia.  So, in a sense 
and in this specific case, size does matter.  All other things being equal Qatar is more 
likely to be susceptible to export resource depletion than Saudi Arabia. 
Second, overtime and as history has shown us, countries like Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar whose export revenues and therefore economies are primarily based on a single 
export are very dependant on the market price fluctuations for that single export.  As 
witnessed in the 80’s through to 2000, a simple and drastic change in the price of oil can 
disrupt their economies for an unknown period of time. 
The third weakness of the export-led growth model for Saudi Arabia and Qatar is 
found in the lack of incentive to develop their human capital.  This lack of incentive is 
due in part to the combination of each government’s political structure and large incomes 
generated from their oil export revenues.  There is no doubt that the poor native labor 
market development in Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s indigenous human capital is due mainly 
to these two factors.  This combination has led to the creation of a “cradle-to-the grave 
welfare system” which much of the population relies on and has no incentive to remove 
itself from.131  This is not to say that either country does not believe in or foster 
                                                 
130 CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. “Qatar,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/qa.html (Accessed December 10, 2008), and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. “Saudi 
Arabia,” https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html (Accessed December 
10, 2008). 
131 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2008), 24. 
 61
education.  This is simply not the case for either Saudi Arabia or Qatar.  Both counties 
have diverted funds from oil rent incomes and placed them towards education programs 
for their people.  Qatar has built an Education City and created a Supreme Education 
Council.132  Saudi Arabia has invested in numerous schools, colleges, and training 
institutions as well as provided scholarships to even send students to western institutions 
of higher-education.  The problem which these two countries face is not the education of 
the populous, but the motivation for them to actually work and be productive citizens.133  
With a limited job market and a limit to attractive job opportunities for educated 
personnel, a robust welfare system, and the possibility to fill a respectable Saudi or Qatari 
position in the future, most citizen will easily opt to remain in a welfare status until an 
opportunity which is in a position of authority, has status, and is respected makes itself 
available.  In other words, the citizens have what is known as the “mudir syndrome.”134     
4. How Have Saudi Arabia and Qatar Dealt with Key Developmental 
Challenges? 
Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have presumably seen the writing on the wall, 
especially after the 70’s oil boom and 80’s and 90’s oil crash.  As explained earlier, size 
does matter.  Because of this unfortunate but real economic conundrum, these two 
countries have dealt with the developmental challenges similarly but, because of the 
physical difference, on a slightly differently scale. 
Saudi Arabia has attempted to expand and invest in several different ventures in 
order to deal with an uncertain oil export future, and based on the consumption and 
production rates of the future it is perceived that they sit on oil reserves which are 
predicted “to last 50 to 250 years,” but nobody knows for sure, maybe not even the 
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Saudis.135  This prediction has led them to develop and invest in several strategies.  The 
first of which is based around a petroleum-based industry, which focuses on 
“petrochemical complexes, fertilizer plants, aluminum smelting, and steel production.”136  
These industries are energy and capital intensive and will exploit the huge oil capacity of 
the country as well as the plethora of capital Saudi Arabia has acquired during the recent 
oil boom of the early 2000’s.  Saudi Arabia’s second strategy is to expand the country’s 
infrastructure with construction projects launched throughout the country, for example 
King Abdullah Economic City and several others planned economic cities.  Focus on this 
strategy has been placed in road, shopping mall, and officer building construction, but 
because of the current limited infrastructure and the numerous requests for projects of 
incredible magnitude, these endeavors have been slow to take off, but are increasing 
exponentially.137  Saudi Arabia’s third and most common of the GCC state’s strategies is 
the investment of their oil revenue funds into financial institutions in the West.  This 
seems to have been a “no brainer” for Saudi Arabia, because they benefited from tapping 
into the knowledge and expertise of the western financial industry and made enormous 
gains.  Lastly, Saudi Arabia has begun the process of sanctioning greater position for 
foreign institutions by increasing its regulatory quality in order to perk up the 
attractiveness and outlook of its financial markets in order to boost foreign investment 
within the country.138 
Qatar, although still relatively abundant in its oil supplies, is really limited to just 
that, oil and natural gas.  Qatar is limited in its expansion of infrastructure due to the 
amount of developable land and the established infrastructure is weak to say the least.  
On the other hand, Qatar has attempted to transform and become an example for Middle 
Eastern economic and social change by investing in and establishing institutions like the 
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Education City, Sports City, and the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC).139  On the same note, 
Qatar’s industrial economy already rests on the shoulders of an immigrant population 
which makes up somewhere between sixty and seventy percent of a total population of 
approximately one million people within the country.140  Even with these surprising 
statistics, Qatar is attempting to build a future like a country which realizes it will 
eventual could run out of its single largest export.  Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, has 
successfully invested overseas and in Western institution, and will likely rely on the 
money earned there in the foreseeable future.  Along those same lines Qatar has followed 
suit with the smaller GCC states and invested in off shore banking, free trade zone, and 
reshipment center infrastructures in hopes of creating and sustaining a market share in the 
Middle East financial industry.141 
An example of Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s attempts to adopt a more western model 
of doing business and in an attempt to attract foreign investments, they have both 
carefully stepped into the controversial sharia realm of financial investments and 
interests.  Since 2001, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar, along with several other Islamic 
states, have become issuers of “sukuks, or sharia-compliant Islamic bonds” in order to 
become competitive with the likes of western and global conventional financial 
institutions.142  Instead of paying or accepting interest, which is against the sharia law, 
the sukuks derive payments from cash flows from material assets and paid out in 
dividends.143  In other word, they have found a work around or loop hole to the sharia in 
order to become competitive within global finance. 
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5. Comparing the Suitability and Sustainability of Saudi Arabia’s and 
Qatar’s Strategies by in Grappling with Globalization 
In Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s defense they have begun the morphing process 
towards economic efficacy, but in grappling with globalization, regional instability, and 
with national, regional, and international external pressures, their combined 
developmental policies may sustain in them in the short run.  For the most part, both 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s economies are still primarily petroleum based and follow the 
oil-export-led growth model.  From their perspectives this may be the most suitable 
strategy for both of these countries, but in the assessment of most MENA economic 
scholars this is not necessarily the case.144  These countries still face issues of fiscal 
transparency and accountability which they are comfortable with, and because of this 
opaqueness these two counties have to miss out on foreign private investment.145 Until 
their models morph into a more Anglo-American like model or something similar will 
practices transparency accountability Saudi Arabia and Qatar will both continue to loose 
out on foreign private investment for the foreseeable future.146 
On the other hand, even though Saudi Arabia and Qatar financial institutions have 
been traditionally centered on Islamic economics and transparent business practices, 
these states have been so heavy involved in the world hydrocarbon sector that the 
globalized nature of the oil business and their more modern and mostly western 
consumers have inadvertently forced them to become accountable and somewhat 
transparent.147  As stated earlier, this hesitance to open up is an artifact left over from a 
period of war and colonization.  Granted, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were less tainted than 
the most counties of the GCC, and therefore actually preserved their societies in a way 
which has allowed them to retain the skills of there native capitalists and their pluralistic  
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societies.  But the fact remains, when compared to western society, those societies which 
apply or practice a “more flexible political system” tend to react and better handle the 
principle effects of globalization.148 
In general, especially in Saudi Arabia’s case, there is no real shortage of capital 
and the future prospective of oil seems to be positive, even given the recent events of 
2008.  Armed with this information, and it can only be perceived that there will be no 
true reason for absolute economic reform or political change.  As I once heard on a BBC 
radio program, “pain is the ultimate motivator for change,” and this seems to be a 
statement fit and applicable to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  Short of the oil markets dropping 
out from underneath them like the years from the mid 1980’s through the year 2000, or 
the oil wells drying up, there will be little to persuade Saudi Arabia or Qatar from 
exploiting their gift of a precious nature resource and grasping onto the power it has 
provided.149  Yet, the problems which Saudi Arabia and Qatar will face in the future may 
be more than they can handle if there is a collapse in the oil market or when oil reserves 
evaporate.150  Furthermore their problem will be worsened by the fact that their work 
force has no real experience and their populations have continued to rapidly expand, 
therefore civil unrest is more likely become rampant as the welfare system dries up, and 
Islamist which has been hiding in the shadows will eventual immerge from the shadows 
and quickly gain followers, inevitably turning hostile against a weak and poor 
government.151  This is a sad but foreseeable scenario for these countries if they do not 
develop a suitable and sustainable plan for the future. 
H. GLOBAL DATA ANALYSIS 
Fredrick Pryor’s universal thoughts on religious member measurement seem to be 
true, where accuracy of any religion can be questioned due to three factors, formal versus 
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informal membership, the advantage of misrepresenting size of religious population, and 
the defined boundaries crossing of similar religions.152  Although Pryor used data from a 
study done by Barrett, Kuran, and Johnson (2001), the data used in this essay was 
collected by the Central Intelligence Agency, from a source know as the CIA Factbook, 
which is easily accessible and reliable (See Tables 1 and 2).153  The globalization index 
data was collected from the KOF Index of Globalization website (see Table 3),154 which 
contained a well defined explanation of their variables and calculations. 
This section took an uncomplicated approach and looked at the variables of GDP, 
Globalization Index performance, and Muslim population percentages, to see what type 
of information could be derived from performing a simple linear regression on these 
variables using current (2007) statistical data.  The goal was to see if any prediction or 
correlation in economic performance could be determined. Furthermore, GDP and 
Muslim Population data from 2000 was also collected to see what type of conclusions 
could be drawn from comparing this pre-9/11 period with the current post-9/11 period. 
All other things being equal, a simple comparison, of the GDP and Muslim 
population of all the U.S. recognized countries of the world percentages from 2000, 
resulted in a non-conclusive negative correlation (r2 = -.076) between the two variables, 
as seen in Figure 7. 
The weak correlation concluded that as Muslim population percentages increased, 
state GDP decreased.  The same yet somewhat higher correlation was seen when the 
analysis was run with the 2007 data (r2 = -.092), see Figure 8. 
Although these regression line were inconclusive, if compared, show that 
countries with small Muslim population percentages at one end of the spectrum increased 
an overall average GDP value by as much as 75 billion dollars, while countries with 
relatively higher Muslim populations at the other end of the spectrum, actually decreased 
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their average GDP by as much as 25 billion dollars.  With that understanding, in 2000 for 
every 1 percent increase in a countries Muslim population there was an average 1.75 
billion dollar loss in GDP.  In 2007 the figure was even higher, for every 1 percent 
increase in Muslim population there was a 2.75 billion dollar loss in GDP.  Over the 
seven-year period, that was an approximate loss in GDP of about 6 percent per year. 



















Figure 7.   GDP vs. Country Muslim Percentage (2000)  
Note: Figure 2 is scaled down to emphasize the significance of the trend line, outliers with GDP greater 
than $300 billion are not displayed, but were used to calculate the regression. 
 
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2001, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2001, s.v. “GDP,” 






























Figure 8.   GDP vs. State Muslim Percentage (2007)  
Note: Figure 3 is scaled down to emphasize the significance of the trend line, outliers with GDP greater 
than $300 billion are not displayed, but were used to calculate the regression.  
 
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. “GDP,” 







A higher correlation was achieved when the 2007 Globalization index (GI) and 
Muslim Populations were compared.  The resultant r2 was equal to -.22, but again not 
extremely conclusive that higher Muslim populations negatively affect their countries 
Globalization index rating.  Of note, after analyzing the GI data more carefully, it was 
discovered that approximately 20 significant and predominately Muslim countries 
(greater that 50%) were left out of the GI.  The assumption is that there was not enough 
data for those countries to give them an accurate GI value.  For arguments sake, when 
these countries were added to the data, and given the arbitrary GI value of 25 (the lowest 
GI value given for 2007), the r2 significantly increased to -.45 (see Figure 9). 
As the results of this analysis were not overly conclusive as to the effect of a 
Muslim population on a country’s economics, it was clear that this study was 
oversimplified and too basic to conclude that a comparison of Muslim population 
percentages to GDP or GI alone could predict the economic performance of a country.  
But it does question the possibility that Islam as a religion, along with its followers, can 
have a direct effect or indirect affect on a country’s economy.  Further study and a more 
detailed analysis, with respect to the economic effects of Islamic religiosity (similar to the 
McClearly and Barro Study) and countries with majority Muslim populations, will be 
conducted via separate a follow-on paper. Another follow-on study would be to compare 
Christian communities in this same respect to see how the progress of these communities 
compared to Islamic communities.  Nations with a majority of Christian followers are 
doing much better in the global market than many of the other religions.  Yet another 
interesting study on how countries with Muslim majorities fair in the market (as of 2007 
approximately 50 out of 230 countries have a religious Islamic majority), as well as those 
countries with Muslim population greater than 50 percent, would be tantalizing.  Even 
better may be to compare countries with similar populations and percentages and see how 






























Figure 9.   Globalization Index vs. State Muslim Percentages (2007) 
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, (Accessed March 4, 2008), 
s.v. “Detailed Rankings,” http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2008.pdf (Accessed April 15, 
2008) 
 
It is obvious that this section is only a scratch on the surface of understanding the 
connection between Islam and economics.  As with the scholars in the Middle Eastern 
field have come to understand, those who continue to research this topic and drive deeper 
into the other comparable factors, which undermine the Islamic countries from entering 
the flattening Global Market playing field, have a difficult road ahead.155 
Although, future research will be enlightening, heartbreaking, and exciting, given 
the right amount of time, continued cultural understanding, and armed with the proper 
knowledge Muslims will band together and rise up against the fundamentalist who are 
resisting adaptation to modern society and social openness.  Muslims will eventually 
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fight for change and fight for the right to take advantage of the positive gains and fruits of 
globalization.  They will get on the globalization train, even if they have to run after it 






% GDP % GDP % GDP
Country Muslim (Billions) Country Muslim (Billions) Country Muslim (Billions)
Afghanistan 99 $21.0 Congo, Rep. of the 2 $3.1 India 12 $2,200.0
Albania 70 $10.5 Cook Islands  0 $0.1 Indonesia 88 $654.0
Algeria 99 $171.0 Costa Rica 0 $25.0 Iran 99 $413.0
American Samoa 0 $0.5 Cote d'Ivoire 27 $26.2 Iraq 97 $57.0
Andorra 0 $1.2 Croatia 1.2 $24.9 Ireland 0 $81.9
Angola 0 $10.1 Cuba 0 $19.2 Israel 14.6 $110.2
Anguilla  0 $0.1 Cyprus  18 $0.8 Italy* 10 $1,273.0
Antigua & Barbuda 0 $0.5 Czech Republic 0 $132.4 Jamaica 0 $9.7
Argentina 0 $476.0 Denmark 2 $136.2 Japan 0 $3,150.0
Armenia 0 $10.0 Djibouti  94 $0.6 Jersey  0 $2.2
Aruba 0 $2.0 Dominica 0 $0.3 Jordan 92 $17.3
Australia 0 $445.8 Dominican Republic 0 $48.3 Kazakhstan 47 $85.6
Austria 0 $203.0 Ecuador 0 $37.2 Kenya 7 $45.6
Azerbaijan 93.4 $23.5 Egypt 94 $247.0 Kiribati 0 $0.1
Bahamas, The 0 $4.5 El Salvador 0 $24.0 Korea, North 0 $22.0
Bahrain 100 $10.1 Equatorial Guinea 0 $1.0 Korea, South 0 $764.6
Bangladesh 83 $203.0 Eritrea* 25 $2.9 Kuwait 85 $29.3
Barbados 0 $4.0 Estonia 0 $14.7 Kyrgyzstan 75 $12.6
Belarus 0 $78.8 Ethiopia 47.5 $39.2 Laos 0 $9.0
Belgium 0 $259.2 Falkland Isle 0 $0.1 Latvia 0 $17.3
Belize 0 $0.8 Faroe Islands 0 $0.9 Lebanon 70 $18.2
Benin 20 $6.6 Fiji  8 $5.9 Lesotho 0 $5.1
Bermuda 0 $2.1 Finland 0 $118.3 Liberia 20 $3.4
Bhutan 0 $2.3 France 3 $1,448.0 Libya 97 $45.4
Bolivia 0 $20.9 French Guiana  0 $1.0 Liechtenstein   0 $0.7
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0 $6.5 French Polynesia   0 $2.6 Lithuania 0 $26.4
Botswana 0 $10.4 Gabon 0 $7.7 Luxembourg 0 $15.9
Brazil 0 $1,130.0 Gambia, The 90 $1.5 Macau 0 $7.8
British Virgin Islands 0 $0.3 Gaza Strip 98.7 $1.1 Macedonia 30 $9.0
Brunei 67 $5.9 Georgia 11 $22.8 Madagascar 7 $12.3
Bulgaria 13 $48.0 Germany 1.7 $1,936.0 Malawi 20 $9.4
Burkina Faso 50 $12.0 Ghana 30 $37.4 Malaysia 0 $223.7
Burma 4 $63.7 Gibraltar   6.9 $0.5 Maldives 100 $0.6
Burundi 10 $4.4 Greece 1.3 $181.9 Mali 90 $9.1
Cambodia 0 $16.1 Greenland 0 $1.1 Malta 0 $5.6
Cameroon 20 $26.0 Grenada 0 $0.4 Man, Isle of   0 $1.4
Canada 0 $774.7 Guadeloupe   0 $3.7 Marshall Islands   0 $0.1
Cape Verde 0 $0.7 Guam 0 $3.2 Martinique   0 $4.4
Cayman Islands   0 $0.9 Guatemala 0 $46.2 Mauritania 100 $5.4
Central African Rep. 15 $6.1 Guernsey   0 $1.3 Mauritius 16.6 $12.3
Chad 50 $8.1 Guinea 85 $10.0 Mayotte   97 $0.1
Chile 0 $153.1 Guinea-Bissau 45 $1.1 Mexico 0 $915.0
China 2.5 $4,500.0 Guyana 9 $3.4 Micronesia  0 $0.3
Christmas Island 10  $NA Haiti 0 $12.7 Moldova 0 $11.3
Cocos Islands 57  $NA Honduras 0 $17.0 Monaco  0 $0.9
Colombia 0 $250.0 Hong Kong 0 $181.0 Mongolia 0 $4.7
Comoros 98 $0.4 Hungary 0 $113.9 Montserrat  0 $0.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 10 $31.0 Iceland 0 $6.9 Morocco 98.7 $105.0
Table 1. (2000 Data)
 
Table 1.   2000 GDP Data 
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% G D P % G D P
C o un try M u slim (B illio n s) C o u n try M u slim (B illio ns)
M o za m b iq u e  2 0 $ 1 9 .1  S in g a p o re* 1 4 .9 $ 1 0 9 .8  
N a m ib ia  0 $ 7 .6  S lo v a k ia  0 $ 5 5 .3  
N a u ru  0 $ 0 .1  S lo v e n ia  1 $ 2 2 .9  
N e p a l 3 .8 $ 3 3 .7  S o lo m o n  Is la n d s  0 $ 0 .9  
N e th erla n d s  4 .4 $ 3 8 8 .4  S o m a lia  1 0 0 $ 4 .3  
N e th erla n d s  A n tille s  0 $ 2 .4  S o u th  A fr ic a  0 $ 3 6 9 .0  
N e w  C a le d o n ia 0 $ 3 .0  S p a in  0 $ 7 2 0 .8  
N e w  Z e a la n d  0 $ 6 7 .6  S ri L a n k a  7 $ 6 2 .7  
N ic a ra g u a  0 $ 1 3 .1  S u d a n  7 0 $ 3 5 .7  
N ig e r 8 0 $ 1 0 .0  S u rin a m e 1 9 .6 $ 1 .5  
N ig e ria  5 0 $ 1 1 7 .0  S w a zila n d  1 0 $ 4 .4  
N iu e 0 $ 0 .0  S w e d e n  0 $ 1 9 7 .0  
N o rfo lk  Is la n d  0  $ N A  S w itze r la nd  0 $ 2 0 7 .0  
 N . M a ria n a  Is la n d s 0 $ 0 .9  S y ria  9 0 $ 5 0 .9  
N o rw a y 0 $ 1 2 4 .1  T a jik is ta n  8 5 $ 7 .3  
O m a n* 7 5 $ 1 9 .6  T a n za n ia  3 5 $ 2 5 .1  
P a k ista n  9 7 $ 2 8 2 .0  T h a ila n d  3 .8 $ 4 1 3 .0  
P a la u 0 $ 0 .1  T o g o  1 2 $ 7 .3  
P a n a m a  0 $ 1 6 .6  T o k e la u 0 $ 0 .0  
P a p u a  N e w  G u ine a  0 $ 1 2 .2  T o n g a  0 $ 0 .2  
P a ra g u a y  0 $ 2 6 .2  T rin id a d  &  T o b a g o  5 .8 $ 1 1 .2  
P e ru  0 $ 1 2 3 .0  T u n is ia  9 8 $ 6 2 .8  
P h ilip p in e s  5 $ 3 1 0 .0  T u rk e y  9 9 $ 4 4 4 .0  
P itc a irn  Is la n d s  0  $ N A  T u rk m e n ista n  8 9 $ 1 9 .6  
P o la nd  0 $ 3 2 7 .5   T u rk s  &  C a ic o s  Is le s 0 $ 0 .1  
P o rtug a l 0 $ 1 5 9 .0  T u v a lu 0 $ 0 .0  
P u e rto  R ic o  0 $ 3 9 .0  U g a n d a  1 6 $ 2 6 .2  
Q a ta r 9 5 $ 1 5 .1  U k ra in e  0 $ 1 8 9 .4  
R e u nio n 0 $ 3 .4  U n ite d  A ra b  E m ira te s 9 6 $ 5 4 .0  
R o m a n ia  0 $ 1 3 2 .5  U n ite d  K ing d o m  2 .5 $ 1 ,3 6 0 .0  
R u ssia * 1 2 $ 1 ,1 2 0 .0  U n ite d  S ta te s  0 $ 9 ,9 6 3 .0  
R w a nd a  1 .9 $ 6 .4  U ru g u a y  0 $ 3 1 .0  
S a in t H e le n a 0 $ 0 .0  U zb e k is ta n  8 8 $ 6 0 .0  
S t. K itts  &  N e v is  0 $ 0 .3  V a n u a tu  0 $ 0 .2  
S a in t L u c ia  0 $ 0 .7  V e n e zu e la  0 $ 1 4 6 .2  
 S t. P ierre  &  M iq u elo n 0 $ 0 .1  V ie tn a m  0 $ 1 5 4 .4  
 S t. V in cen t &  G ren a d in es 0 $ 0 .3  V irg in  Is la n d s  0 $ 1 .8  
S a m o a  0 $ 0 .6  W a llis  a n d  F u tu n a 0 $ 0 .0  
S a n  M a rin o  0 $ 0 .9  W e st B a n k  7 5 $ 3 .1  
S a o  T o m e  &  P rinc ip e  0 $ 0 .2  Y e m e n  9 9 $ 1 4 .4  
S a u d i A ra b ia  1 0 0 $ 2 3 2 .0  Y u g o sla v ia  1 9 $ 2 4 .2  
S e n e g a l 9 2 $ 1 6 .0  Z a m b ia  2 4 $ 8 .5  
S e y c he lle s  0 $ 0 .6  Z im b a b w e  0 $ 2 8 .2  
S ie rra  L e o n e  6 0 $ 2 .7  T a iw a n  0 $ 3 8 6 .0  
T a b le  1 . (2 0 0 0  D a ta ) C o n tin u e d
 
 
Table 2.   2000 GDP and Muslim Percentage Data (Continued from Table 1) 
*Note: Some Muslim percentages were not specifically defined in the CIA World Factbook 2001; countries 
such as Russia Singapore had no percentage value so 2007 percentages were used.   Some countries 
reported their Muslim population as “other,” to be consistent; those countries were given a zero 
percentage.  Somalia which reported no percentage but reported Islam as their only religion were given a 
value of 100 percent.  Countries (Italy and Eritrea) which gave a mix of religions including Islam but no 
percentage value, where given a proportion value of based on the number of religions listed.  Where 2000 
data was not available, the CIA World Factbook supplied the most recent and current data available. 
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2001, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2001, s.v. “GDP,” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008). 
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% GDP % GDP % GDP
Country Muslim (Billions) Country Muslim (Billions) Country Muslim (Billions)
Afghanistan 99 $9.9  Costa Rica 0 $22.8  Ireland 0 $253.3 
 Albania 70 $11.2  Côte d'Ivoire 37.5 $19.5  Isle of Man 0 $2.7 
 Algeria 99 $125.9  Croatia 1.3 $51.0  Israel 16 $132.5 
 American Samoa 0 $333.8  Cuba 0 $45.1  Italy 0 $2,068.0 
 Andorra 0 $0.0  Cyprus 18 $17.4  Jamaica 0 $8.9 
 Angola 0 $61.0  Czech Republic 0 $168.1  Japan 0 $4,346.0 
 Anguilla 0 $0.1  Denmark 2 $310.7  Jersey 0 $5.1 
 Antigua and Barbuda 0 $1.1  Djibouti 94 $0.8  Jordan 92 $15.7 
 Argentina 0 $245.6  Dominica 0 $0.3  Kazakhstan 47 $95.5 
 Armenia 0 $9.3  Dominican Republic 0 $35.5  Kenya 10 $29.5 
 Aruba 0 $2.3  Ecuador 0 $44.5  Kiribati 0 $0.1 
 Australia 0 $889.7  Egypt 90 $127.9  North Korea 0 $2.2 
 Austria 4.2 $366.7  El Salvador 0 $20.2  South Korea 0 $991.0 
 Azerbaijan 93.4 $31.1  Equatorial Guinea 0 $9.5  Kosovo* 25 $3.2 
 Bahamas 0 $6.6  Eritrea 0 $1.4  Kuwait 85 $103.4 
 Bahrain 81.2 $16.9  Estonia 0 $21.2  Kyrgyzstan 75 $3.5 
 Bangladesh 83 $70.6  Ethiopia 32.8 $16.9  Laos 0 $4.0 
 Barbados 0 $3.7  Falkland Islands 0 $0.0  Latvia 0 $27.0 
 Belarus 0 $38.7  Faroe Islands 0 $1.7  Lebanon 59.7 $24.0 
 Belgium 0 $442.8  Fiji 7 $3.3  Lesotho 0 $1.6 
 Belize 0 $1.3  Finland 0 $236.1  Liberia 20 $0.7 
 Benin 0 $5.4  France 7.5 $2,515.0  Libya 97 $66.0 
 Bermuda 0 $0.0  French Polynesia 0 $3.8  Liechtenstein 0 $36.3 
 Bhutan 0 $1.2  Gabon 0 $10.3  Lithuania 0 $28.6 
 Bolivia 0 $12.8  The Gambia 90 $0.4  Luxembourg 0 $47.7 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina 40 $14.2  Gaza Strip 99.3 $5.3  Macau 0 $14.3 
 Botswana 0 $11.4  Georgia 9.9 $9.6  Rep. of Macedonia 33.3 $6.9 
 Brazil 0 $1,269.0  Germany 3.7 $3,259.0  Madagascar 7 $7.3 
 British Virgin Islands 0 $0.8  Ghana 15.9 $14.9  Malawi 12.8 $3.4 
 Brunei 67 $12.5  Gibraltar 4 $1.1  Malaysia 60.4 $165.0 
 Bulgaria 12.2 $39.1  Greece 1.3 $356.3  Maldives* 100 $1.0 
 Burkina Faso 50 $6.9  Greenland 0 $1.7  Mali 90 $6.9 
 Burma 4 $13.7  Grenada 0 $0.6  Malta 0 $6.5 
 Burundi 10 $1.0  Guam 0 $2.8  Marshall Islands 0 $0.1 
 Cambodia 0 $8.3  Guatemala 0 $31.4  Mauritania 100 $2.7 
 Cameroon 20 $20.9  Guernsey 0 $2.7  Mauritius 16.6 $7.0 
 Canada 1.9 $1,406.0  Guinea-Bissau 85 $4.6  Mayotte 97 $0.0 
 Cape Verde 0 $1.4  Guinea 45 $0.3  Mexico 0 $886.4 
 Cayman Islands 0 $0.0  Guyana 10 $1.0  Micronesia 0 $0.2 
 Central African Rep. 15 $1.6  Haiti 0 $5.3  Moldova 0 $4.0 
 Chad 53.1 $7.4  Honduras 0 $10.1  Monaco 0 $0.0 
 Chile 0 $160.8  Hong Kong 0 $203.0  Mongolia 4 $3.9 
 P.R. of China 1.5 $3,249.0  Hungary 0 $136.4  Montenegro* 33 $2.3 
 Colombia 0 $171.7  Iceland 0 $19.5  Montserrat 0 $0.0 
 Comoros 98 $0.4  India 13.4 $1,090.0  Morocco 98.7 $72.8 
 D.R. of the Congo 10 $9.9  Indonesia 86.1 $410.3  Mozambique 17.8 $8.1 
 Republic of the Congo 2 $6.8  Iran 98 $278.1  Namibia 0 $6.7 
 Cook Islands 0 $0.2  Iraq 97 $55.4  Nauru 0 $0.0 
Table 2. (2007 Data)
 
Table 3.   2007 GDP and Muslim Percentage Data 
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% G D P % G D P
C ountry M uslim (Billions) C ountry M uslim (B illions)
 N epal 4 .2 $9 .6   So lom on Islands 0 $0 .4  
 N etherlands A ntilles 5 .5 $754 .9   Som alia* 100 $2 .5  
 N etherlands 0 $0 .0   South A frica 1 .5 $274 .5  
 N ew  C aledonia 0 $3 .3   Spa in 0 $1 ,415.0  
 N ew  Zealand 0 $124 .4   Sri Lanka 7 .6 $25 .8  
 N icaragua 0 $5 .7   Sudan 70 $49 .7  
 N iger 80 $4 .2   Surinam e 19 .6 $2 .2  
 N igeria 50 $126 .7   Ta iw an 10 $2 .7  
 N iue 0 $0 .0   Sw aziland 0 $431 .6  
 N . M ariana  Islands 0 $0 .6   Sw eden 4 .3 $413 .9  
 N orway 1 .8 $369 .3   Sw itzerland 90 $29 .3  
 O m an 75 $40 .5   Syria 0 $375 .6  
 Pakistan 97 $106 .3   Ta jik istan 90 $3 .4  
 Pa lau 0 $0 .1   Tanzania 35 $14 .1  
 Panam a 0 $19 .3   Thailand 4 .6 $225 .8  
 Papua N ew  G uinea 0 $5 .9   T im or-Leste 1 $0 .5  
 Paraguay 0 $9 .3   Togo 20 $2 .4  
 Peru 0 $101 .5   Tokelau 0 $0 .0  
 Philipp ines 5 $144 .1   Tonga 0 $0 .2  
 Po land 0 $413 .3   Trinidad  and  Tobago 5 .8 $14 .2  
 Portugal 0 $219 .5   Tunisia 98 $34 .5  
 Puerto  R ico 0 $0 .0   Turkey 99 .8 $482 .0  
 Q atar 77 .5 $65 .8   Turkm enistan 89 $26 .2  
 R om ania 0 $158 .5   Turks &  Caicos Islands 0 $0 .0  
 R ussia* 12 .5 $1 ,286 .0   Tuvalu 0 $0 .0  
 R w anda 4 .6 $2 .8   U ganda 12 .1 $11 .1  
 Sa int H elena 0 $0 .0   U kra ine 0 $131 .2  
 Sa int K itts and  N evis 0 $0 .5   U nited  A rab  E m ira tes 96 $189 .6  
 Sa int Lucia 0 $1 .0   U nited  K ingdom 2 .7 $2 ,756.0  
 S t. Pierre &  M iquelon 0 $0 .0   U nited  States 0 .6 $13 ,790  
 S t. Vincent &  G renadines 0 $0 .5   U ruguay 0 $21 .2  
 Sam oa 0 $0 .4   U zbek istan 88 $20 .2  
 San M arino 0 $1 .0   Vanuatu 0 $0 .4  
 São  Tom é &  Príncipe 0 $0 .1   Venezuela 0 $226 .9  
 Saudi A rabia 100 $374 .5   Vietnam 0 .1 $66 .4  
 Senegal 94 $13 .0   U .S. Virg in Islands 0 $0 .0  
 Serb ia 3 .2 $41 .0   W allis and Futuna 0 $0 .0  
 Seychelles 1 .1 $0 .7   W est B ank 75 $5 .3  
 Sierra  Leone 60 $1 .5   Y em en 75 $22 .7  
 Singapore 14 .9 $153 .5   Zam bia* 25 $10 .9  
 Slovak ia 0 $71 .6   Z im babw e* 1 $16 .2  
 Slovenia 2 .4 $44 .6   W orld 21 .01 $53 ,640  
Table 2 . (2007  D ata) C ontinued
 
 
Table 4.   2007 GDP and Muslim Percentage Data (Continued from Table 3) 
*Note: Some Muslim percentages were not specifically defined in the CIA World Factbook 2008; countries 
such as Russia (Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia) contained a range of values, of which the average was taken.  
Some countries reported their Muslim population as “other,” to be consistent; those countries were given a 
zero percentage value. Countries (Maldives and Somalia) which reported no percentage but reported Islam 
as their only religion were given a value of 100 percent.  Countries (Kosovo, Montenegro, Yemen) which 
gave a mix of religions including Islam but no percentage value, where given a proportion value of based 
on the number of religions listed.  Where 2007 data was not available, the CIA World Factbook supplied 
the most recent and current data available.  
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, s.v. “GDP,” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008). 
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GI % GI % GI %
Country Rating Muslim Country Rating Muslim Country Rating Muslim
 Albania 42.0 70.0  Germany 82.5 3.7  Norway 77.8 1.8
 Algeria 45.5 99.0  Ghana 56.0 15.9  Oman 51.7 75.0
 Argentina 64.1 0.0  Greece 74.9 1.3  Pakistan 52.4 97.0
 Australia 80.9 0.0  Guatemala 50.0 0.0  Panama 57.6 0.0
 Austria 91.6 4.2  Guinea-Bissau 40.7 85.0  Papua New Guinea 41.6 0.0
 Bahamas 47.9 0.0  Guyana 47.4 10.0  Paraguay 50.3 0.0
 Bahrain 60.9 81.2  Haiti 28.6 0.0  Peru 57.1 0.0
 Bangladesh 36.0 83.0  Honduras 54.0 0.0  Philippines 59.0 5.0
 Barbados 43.5 0.0  Hungary 81.2 0.0  Poland 78.2 0.0
 Belgium 92.0 0.0  Iceland 67.8 0.0  Portugal 83.1 0.0
 Belize 47.3 0.0  India 49.7 13.4  Puerto Rico 63.3 0.0
 Benin 41.7 0.0  Indonesia 51.3 86.1  Russia* 69.9 12.5
 Bolivia 49.1 0.0  Iran 35.2 98.0  Rwanda 29.3 4.6
 Botswana 46.8 0.0  Ireland 83.1 0.0  Saudi Arabia 53.7 100.0
 Brazil 59.6 0.0  Israel 70.8 16.0  Senegal 48.6 94.0
 Bulgaria 65.5 12.2  Italy 80.6 0.0  Sierra Leone 33.3 60.0
 Burundi 25.8 10.0  Jamaica 62.9 0.0  Singapore 82.1 14.9
 Cameroon 41.3 20.0  Japan 64.2 0.0  Slovakia 72.6 0.0
 Canada 87.5 1.9  Jordan 64.7 92.0  Slovenia 68.8 2.4
 Central African Rep 26.8 15.0  Kenya 49.1 10.0  South Africa 62.5 1.5
 Chad 39.6 53.1  South Korea 64.8 0.0  Spain 82.5 0.0
 Chile 69.9 0.0  Kuwait 63.5 85.0  Sri Lanka 49.7 7.6
 People's Rep of China 65.3 1.5  Latvia 61.6 0.0  Sweden 89.9 4.3
 Colombia 52.3 0.0  Lithuania 63.3 0.0  Switzerland 85.5 90.0
 Demo Rep of the Congo 35.5 10.0  Luxembourg 74.2 0.0  Syria 39.1 0.0
 Republic of the Congo 38.8 2.0  Madagascar 37.5 7.0  Tanzania 43.2 35.0
 Costa Rica 55.0 0.0  Malawi 43.7 12.8  Thailand 56.9 4.6
 Côte d'Ivoire* 45.4 37.5  Malaysia 75.8 60.4  Togo 42.2 20.0
 Croatia 69.3 1.3  Mali 42.4 90.0  Trinidad and Tobago 50.8 5.8
 Cyprus 62.5 18.0  Malta 63.8 0.0  Tunisia 51.8 98.0
 Czech Republic 84.5 0.0  Mauritius 48.8 16.6  Turkey 63.5 99.8
 Denmark 84.3 2.0  Mexico 55.5 0.0  Uganda 44.5 12.1
 Dominican Republic 51.7 0.0  Morocco 52.9 98.7  Ukraine 61.8 0.0
 Ecuador 54.5 0.0  Myanmar (Burma) 27.3 4.0  United Arab Emirates 70.4 96.0
 Egypt 54.2 90.0  Namibia 53.8 0.0  United Kingdom 89.3 2.7
 El Salvador 58.0 0.0  Nepal 35.3 4.2  United States 80.8 0.6
 Estonia 72.1 0.0  Netherlands 89.2 0.0  Uruguay 61.8 0.0
 Fiji 48.5 7.0  New Zealand 73.5 0.0  Venezuela 53.8 0.0
 Finland 84.8 0.0  Nicaragua 51.6 0.0  Zambia* 51.8 25.0
 France 87.7 7.5  Niger 34.3 80.0  Zimbabwe 40.1 1.0
 Gabon 49.2 0.0  Nigeria 53.0 50.0
Table 3. (Globalization Index 2007 Data)
 
Table 5.   Globalization Index and Muslim Percentage 2007 Data 
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2008, s.v. “Religion,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (Accessed March 4, 2008) and CIA World Fact Book 2008, (Accessed March 4, 2008), 
s.v. “Detailed Rankings,” http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2008.pdf (Accessed April 15, 
2008) 
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V. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON MIDDLE EAST 
CULTURE 
A. GETTING ON THE GLOBALIZATION TRAIN 
The intent of this thesis is by no means to foster any idea of doing away with the 
traditional Islamic faith or Arab culture.  The fact is that the Islamic faith and its 
respective traditions have given many of its Muslim followers complete and utter 
satisfaction, and it has also been a positive influence on multiple cultures around the 
world.  But, it is imperative to bring to light the necessity for Islamic Arabs in the Middle 
East, like other cultures and regions, to discover a common ground between their faith 
and culture and the inevitability of the rapidly approaching globalization train.  Granted 
there is another responsible party on this globalization train, that of its “western 
conductor,” or promoter.  It is the responsibility of the conductor to slow the train down 
in order to allow passengers to get on rather than passing them by, forcing them to jump 
on, or just plain running them over. 
What if Arab Islamic Middle Easterners do not want to get on is particular type of 
train?  The question which needs to be asked is whether or not there is another train?  Is 
there a train that is better suited to their wants, needs, and style?  Maybe there is another 
train in which they can be more than just a passenger.  A train which allows then to give 
their input on the type of seats and color of the fabric, and other options which would 
make the train more comfortable for them, in other words, a train which they will want to 
ride because they have a vested interest in it. 
Summed up, this is a cultural and global learning process in which promoters of 
globalization must entertain and participate in, to facilitate or potentially accommodate 
those populations which may end up being passengers on the globalization train.  
Although a debatable presumption, it can be assumed that the majority of Islamic Arabs, 
in general, want to get on a globalization train, that is, they want to have the “best and 
most enjoyable” life possible and take advantage of the benefits of globalization.  Yet, 
there is also a belief that a minority of Islamic followers, the fundamentalist and militant 
radicals (violent or extreme Islamists), are holding back, through various acts and are 
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preventing the Islamic Arab majority from getting on the globalization train.  The 
Islamists believe, in the most basic sense, that they are literally defending the 
fundamentals of their religion and their Islamic community against the influences of 
globalization and their definition of the “Westernization” world.  Their defense, in effect, 
has caused those countries, in which they reside, to fall economically farther and farther 
behind.  If the majority of the Islamic Arab community could be made aware of this 
problem, where they stand economically in the world market, and that they are being held 
back by unwavering fundamentalist minority ideologies, maybe then they would rise up 
against their own resident Islamists.  In effect, radical Islamic fundamentalism could fall 
not to the sword of western powers, but rather, from within its own community and by 
the soft voice of it own constituents. 
B. MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
One of the wonders of current globalization is that of cultural knowledge and 
information exchange, which has been basically brought about by the advances made in 
technology and communication mediums.  Particularly, in the Middle East, computers, 
cellular phones, and satellite televisions have all been important contributors to this 
information exchange. 
There are several examples of Middle Eastern authoritarian regime control over 
information, extending from the outlawing of public forums and protests to suppression 
of the internet, but none of which are more salient than the censorship of the Arab media 
and news networks.  The purpose of this section is to bring to light the Middle Eastern 
and Western love and hate relationship with the rising Arab Islamic media, and for 
specific illustrations of these perspectives the international and well known Al-Jazeera 
network will be the prime media model.  This section, will examine the rapport between 
Al-Jazeera and the proponents and opponents both in the Middle East and the West in 
order to illustrate that the technological element of globalization, represented by satellite 
media communication, over the past decade and a half can be viewed as influential and 
positive to some and controversial and threatening to others. 
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Regimes of the Middle East which utilize authoritarian rule as a means of 
governance use several methods of control to repress their populations in order to 
maintain the existing ruling power.  The problem facing Middle Eastern authoritarian 
regimes is that globalization of the Arab Islamic Middle East, which consists of political, 
economic, social, and technological elements, has provided the opportunity for the 
oppressed and information famished populations of the region to be nurtured with 
information from uncontrolled and uncensored sources. 
Throughout the twentieth century the Arab Islamic Middle Eastern population 
was starved of important and relevant knowledge concerning the local, regional, and 
international world events around them.  Advances in satellite technology towards the 
end of the 20th century, specifically in the realm of information media broadcasting, 
enabled the Middle Eastern Arab Islamic population to view the world around them, and 
simultaneously allowed the world to gain a detailed and in depth view of the Arab world.  
Middle East scholars such as Gentzkow and Shapiro, Nobel Peace Prize winner Elie 
Wiesel, and western policy makers such as World Bank President James Wolfensohn, 
believe that “increasing access to information in a broad sense will improve relations 
between the Muslim world and the West.”156  Although proponents of this statement 
believe this to be true, there are opponents, both in the Middle East and in the West, who 
believe that the freedom with which these rising Arab satellite media outlets are 
broadcasting the story of the Middle East region is instead a credible threat to their 
authority. 
1. Middle Eastern Love and Hate 
To understand the Middle East’s infatuation with Al-Jazeera’s programming is to 
know and understand the history of a Middle Eastern Arab people who have never truly 
had access to legitimate and uncensored Arab mass media.  Unlike the past, advances in 
satellite technology have allowed media broadcasters to cross national boarders and 
                                                 
156 Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the 
Muslim World,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 118. 
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circumvent Authoritarian regime control.157  In addition and after the first Gulf War 
(1990–1991), satellite television and its access expanded rapidly in many parts of the 
Middle East.158  Over the last decade and a half, satellite television has become a 
mainstay in Middle Eastern life, and can be placed in the same category of importance as 
electricity, food, and water.159  With that being said, perceptions and views of current 
events happening locally, regionally, and internationally are formed around the 
broadcasts and news coverage produced by these satellite news stations, and because of 
this enormous influence, both leaders in the West and in the Middle East are concerned. 
There are numerous Arab media broadcasting stations throughout the world which 
air in the Arabic language and can be received via satellite in the Middle East region.  
From the Arab perspective, most of the satellite stations, which feed into the Middle East 
and are meant for Arab viewers, face a bias in one of two ways, either through viewer 
interest or media legitimacy.  On one hand, there are stations like Rusiya Al-Yaum 
(Russian) and BBC Arabic Television (U.K.), which are transmitted in Arabic from 
outside the region into television inside the Middle East.  Although these stations are 
allowed more free speech and not handicapped by local Authoritarian authorities, much 
of the broadcasting has a Western spin, external area bias, or has non-compelling 
programming.  In other words, because they are not physically located within the region 
itself, Middle Eastern viewers see these stations as out of touch with real and actual 
regional concerns.160  On the other hand, stations like Al Arabiya (Saudi Arabia), Al-
Alam (Iran), and Egyptian Space Channel (Egypt), although based in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, are state run enterprises with Authoritarian government or 
government proxy ownership, and are severely censored and coerced. 161 
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Overall, the Middle East populous believes that Al-Jazeera is a media network of 
a different sort.  Al-Jazeera is based in Qatar and the only assumed connection to the 
government is through a one time grant given at the stations inception by the Qatar’s 
Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.162  Yet further research confirms Al-Jazeera, 
which has not achieved total independence, still receives yearly subsidies from the 
Emir.163  Given this connection, Al-Jazeera’s wide scope and highly controversial output 
are evidence to the fact that the regionally based station is closer legitimacy, and closer to 
independence from both government censorship and intervention than most regional 
media outlets.  At this time, Al-Jazeera is the only Arab international network which truly 
compares to the likes of CNN and BBC, and is quickly becoming one of the first 
internationally trusted Arab media networks. 
In some older and more anti-western circles of the Middle East, even Al-Jazeera 
like the rest of Arab media still retains the stigma of being a tool of coercion and control 
by Authoritarian rulers.  Although some perceive Al-Jazeera to be a pro-Arab Islamic 
Middle Eastern satellite channel,164 used to rally Arabs inside and outside the region, 
others proclaim this to be false perception.  Some common everyday Arabs perceive Al-
Jazeera to be a modern tool of authoritarian security and information collection.  In fact, 
statements made in threatening tones like, “Do you want your name to be on Al-Jazeera,” 
can be heard in some pessimistic and fearful circles today.165  Furthermore, given Al-
Jazeera’s western reporting techniques and appearance, other Arab circles believe the 
network is really just an extension of western coercion delivered by turncoat Arab 
personnel.166   
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As influential reporter and writer Thomas Friedman put it, Al-Jazeera has become 
“the biggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab world since the television.”167  Yet, its 
uncensored programming and news broadcasts have infuriated many of the Arab 
Authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East.  Authoritarian regimes have even 
allegedly threatened their local businesses in order to dissuade them from purchasing 
advertising airtime on Al-Jazeera.168  In addition, Arab rulers in the region have publicly 
and privately criticized Qatar and its ruling family, the home and sponsor to Al Jazeera, 
for the critical reporting done on the rest of the ruling regimes in the Middle East while 
only “soft” coverage of Qatar has been reported.169  Others criticize the network’s actual 
impact on politics in the region, claiming that the debates which appear on the network 
are entertaining, but not likely to affect any decision making by Middle East authorities. 
Even with this sort of criticism, Al-Jazeera has become a sort of Arab “human 
nervous system” which has come to connect Arabs around the global with one another 
and evolved to become a source of perceived legitimate information in which Arabs 
inside and outside the region of the Middle East can trust and respect, and yet at the same 
time Arab and some western authorities have come to despise and fear.170 
2. Western Love and Hate 
For expatriate Arabs around the world, primarily in western countries located in 
North America and Europe, Al-Jazeera is a trusted link back to their country of origin, 
spoken in a common and familiar language, and attune to their concerns and interests.171  
Similarly, Al-Jazeera has also afforded western non Arabs with the opportunity to peer 
into the world of the Middle East.  Arab and Middle Eastern images and reports that were 
once pushed into the margins of network news coverage or tagged as not news worthy 
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now have an outlet and a target audience.  Al-Jazeera has provided such an opportunity 
for the West to learn about the Middle East and at the same time provided the opportunity 
for the Middle East to understand the West.  As Hugh Miles stated in his book on Al-
Jazeera, “the information age is upon us and in the decades ahead we can expect only 
more Al-Jazeeras,” and with more media station like Al-Jazeera information will 
continue to spread and be transferred between once isolated and inaccessible cultures. 172 
Given the tragic events which expired on September 11, 2001, the West quickly 
came to grips with the notion that it must gain knowledge about, study, and understand a 
new Middle Eastern threat.  Prior to Al-Jazeera, much of the “legitimate” news coverage 
on the Middle East came from Western sources like the BBC and CNN.  The problem, 
which would soon come to light, was that the coverage and distributed product, although 
from a prominent and legitimate source, contained a western bias or slant and was not 
always accurate.  Like CNN and the BBC, Al-Jazeera has its proponents and opponents 
within the Middle East and around the world, but unlike CNN and the BBC, Al-Jazeera 
has earned a special connection, trust, and access which the others do not possess within 
the Middle East.  Because of this special relationship and access to locations within the 
Middle East, Al-Jazeera’s network has become a knowledge base not only for the Middle 
Eastern populous, but for western intelligence collection agencies gathering open source 
intelligence material. 
From the standpoint of many senior U.S. government officials, Al-Jazeera 
represents and promotes an anti-American bias in the Arab media.173  Although the word 
“hate” maybe strong a word to use to describe western views of the Arab media, the  
The West, and more specifically the U.S., has taken action to counter and offer 
alternatives to Arab media networks like Al-Jazeera.  First, senior officials like Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld have publicly condemned Al-Jazeera and others have appealed to the 
Emir of Qatar to tone down the coverage of American military action in the Middle East, 
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and U.S. officials eventually shut down the Baghdad Al-Jazeera office. 174  Secondly, in 
2004, the U.S. Congress authorized $62 million to launch an Arabic television channel 
called Al-Hurra or "The Free One” to counter Arab media like Al-Jazeera, to win the 
hearts and minds of the Arab people, and to promote democracy in the Arab world.175  A 
station manager of Al-Hurra, Mouafac Harb who is a Beirut born Muslim, stated in an 
interview that Al-Jazeera does fuel anti-Americanism, but that it is not clear whether the 
network is doing it intentionally or unintentionally.176  
Setting aside the proposed anti-American bias, another way to view the effect that 
Al-Jazeera and the increasing number of Arab media outlets have on the West is a so 
called a “disciplining effect.”  In other words, legitimate international Arab media, in 
local languages, has increased the global competition for Middle East regional viewers.  
In 2006, Gentzkow and Shaprio conducted a study using empirical evidence which 
proved that international media monopolies (like CNN and BBC) allowed Western media 
bias and erroneous reporting to exist in the Middle East region.  The study went on to 
show that the introduction of Arab news outlets, like Al-Jazeera, have in fact lowered the 
total amount of Western partiality and flawed reporting in the region.177  The point being, 
that the introduction of equivalent legitimate international Arab media outlets increased 
the likelihood that Western media as well as U.S. government reports would be less bias 
and more accurate in accounting for actions in the Middle East, for fear that erroneous 
reporting would be exposed ex post by Al-Jazeera media broadcasts, and western media 
stations could ultimately lose viewer confidence.178 
Along these same lines the debate about freedom of speech becomes a highly 
sensitive topic.  For many years the West dominated the airwaves and television stations 
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throughout the world.  If competition for viewers and content of programming was not 
enough to worry about, countries like the U.S. have paradoxically had an issue with Al-
Jazeera’s free style and free media behavior.179  One of the biggest confrontations that 
Al-Jazeera has had with the West at large and the U.S. specifically, as stated by officials 
like Secretary of State Colin Powell, is that Al-Jazeera has on many occasions given 
undue attention to terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden interviews, 
and other terrorist video tapings.180  Furthermore, the U.S. Government claims that Al-
Jazeera has over reported and formally criticized the mistakes of U.S. military’s actions 
in the Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the world. 
In some cases western powers feel like they are caught in a “Catch .22,” because 
freedom of speech has been promoted by the West as a basic human right.  Through 
example, the West taught media outlets like Al-Jazeera how to report both sides of a 
controversy, fairly and without bias.  In a sense, through the promotion of democracy and 
the freedom of speech, the West may have indirectly fostered and educated, in their 
minds, a media “monster” that has now turned against them.  So, as the attention in crisis’ 
like the GWOT, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to stagnate, Al-Jazeera 
has vowed to report what it deems appropriate whether or not the U.S. or the West feels 
the same way.  Al-Jazeera representatives feel that they have the right to report on 
something they disagree with and it is their right to express their opinion even if it 
possibly comes at the expense of Middle East and Western relations. 181 
3. Summary 
This section set out to examine how the technological element of globalization, as 
represented by satellite media communication, over the past decade and a half could be 
viewed as influential and positive to some and controversial and threatening to others.  
The positives of uncensored Arab satellite media, promotion of democracy, freedom of 
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speech, and cultural awareness and education, will most likely outweigh and overcome 
the realization that authoritarian regimes face losing their information control and 
western government’s controversial actions will continue to be criticized.  Given the fact 
that there is a Middle Eastern and Western love and hate relationship between the Arab 
media, the statement presented earlier which states that “information access will improve 
the relationship between the Middle East and the West,”182 may in fact hold water, but 
only the future will tell.   
This section also demonstrated how uncensored satellite media technology has the 
ability to reach out to Arabs and western audiences around the world and possibly affect 
policy and decision-making globally.  Although major international media networks, like 
CNN and the BBC news still dominate space and airtime, Al-Jazeera is quickly following 
suit and becoming the CNN/BBC of the Middle East and one of the most trusted sources 
of Arab news and information.  Although, it can be debated between proponents and 
opponents whether or not Al-Jazeera recognizes and reports impartiality on contending 
subjects and issues important to the Arab people with vigor and legitimacy, there is no 
doubt the information age has forever changed the way Arabs view media. 
Authoritarian regimes, under threat of losing control over the information flow 
within their respective counties, will attempt to adapt to this unstoppable regional 
informational phenomenon, but may discover that influence over a control mechanism 
may now be beyond their grasp.  Similarly, the West which has promoted this spread of 
technology and free speech must also stand fast and be prepared for competition and 
criticism.  For the world and especially the Middle East, globalization has spread the gift 
of technology, Pandora’s Box has been opened, and a flood of information in an 
increasingly abundant amount will blanket the earth over the next decade and a half.   
Lastly, there is no doubt that information collection and dissemination has 
become part of world’s daily life.  How easy or how difficult the task of collecting and 
disseminating that information is generally based on where you are in the world.  On the 
other hand, it is certain that today’s technological advances in cellular, internet, and 
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satellite communication have increased mans ability to mass communicate just about 
anywhere in the world at any given time.  In a sense, technology has opened the world for 
all to see and given man the ability to reach out and touch a society that years ago he 
would have known nothing about. 
C. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS OF TERRORISM 
Globalization has allowed terrorist groups increase transnational access to people 
and places around the world, and provided numerous technologies and communication 
tools which years ago they would never dreamed of attaining.  Is it possible that 
globalization is an enabler of terrorism?  This section will address the conditions and 
causes of terrorism, as seen through the eyes of several experts in the field of terrorism. 
In several article and books, Martha Crenshaw explains cogently what the causes 
of terrorism are.  If society were able to address those causes, could we defeat terrorism?  
There is no doubt that Crenshaw’s scholarly works logically explain the causes and 
conditions of terrorism.183  There is no doubt if society could address all the various 
causes and conditions of terrorism; in a perfect world it could, in fact, eradicate terrorism.  
But this is by no means a perfect world and definitely not a utopia so the question is not 
whether society can defeat terrorism, but whether or not it can address the causes and 
conditions that make terrorism the option of action.  The question of whether terrorism 
will ever truly be defeated is a quite relevant one, but not realistic.  The answer to this 
question is more complicated than a simple “yes” or “no.” 
It is an obvious fact that the use of terrorism as a tactic has been around for 
centuries.  Although it is generally a tactic of the weak, it has been used by the strong and 
the weak alike.  It has been seen as an effective tactic by those who have chosen to use it 
to achieve their goal or goals, and by those factions it has been used against.  Even 
though there are many forms and groups of terrorist sects, for the purpose of this paper I 
will briefly utilize the Islamist as my test case example.  The Islamist easily displays both 
a religious and political aspect within the cause(s) for which the group is fight for or 
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defending.  It is for these duel motivations (political and religious) that make answering 
the title question even more difficult, more complicated, and an almost impossible to 
postulate a formidable response. 
This section is by no means an end all be all answer to defeating the causes and 
conditions of terrorism altogether.  On the contrary, it is more or less a light surface scan 
of the theoretical building blocks of terrorism, i.e., Crenshaw’s causal conditions where 
terrorism eventually becomes an option. 
Let’s observe Crenshaw’s “conditions” of terrorism.  In the book The New Global 
Terrorism by Charles W. Kegley Jr., Part Two, Chapter Eight “The Causes of 
Terrorisms,” Crenshaw describes what she believes to be the causes of terrorism.184  
Crenshaw briefly attests to the notion that “modernization” and “urbanization” are the 
factors that aid in creating the framework from which brew the basic foundations of 
terrorism ideologies.185  Furthermore, for this essay it will be assumed that urbanization 
is a byproduct of modernization, and that modernization is the original foundation of 
terrorism.  Again, this paper is not meant to prove or disprove the causes of terrorism, but 
to rather understand why terrorism can neither be truly avoided nor destroyed altogether. 
The obvious point which can be inferred is that, if modernization itself is the basic 
building block for the causes of terrorism, we can never truly defeat terrorism.   
Modernization by itself is an unstoppable force which is needed in order to continue and 
sustain life on earth as we know it.  If this is true, we must then look at the causal 
conditions of terrorism that spawn from modernization.  Crenshaw states that 
modernization over the years has generated so many religious, “social” and “economical 
complexities,” and it is from the complexities, that “grievances” are created and formed 
in certain minority groups.186  Moreover, it is this formed grievance that, if powerful 
enough, will eventually create an overwhelming amount of dissatisfaction and 
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resentment.  If we could somehow stop this condition of terrorism here (i.e., allow the 
grieved party to express themselves) there would most likely be less of a reason for the 
grieved party to possibly feel the need to adopt the tactic of terrorism. 
In order for the grieved party to be heard, they would need some kind of outlet 
from which to be heard.  This then leads us to the second condition of terrorism, which is 
described by Crenshaw as the lack of opportunity for “political participation.”187  
Undoubtedly, if we allowed the grieved party to express themselves in a formal and 
political way, we would surely then be able to stop the build up of dissatisfaction and 
resentment, right?  On the contrary, political participation alone would be the easy 
solution, but it is more detailed and complicated than that.  When needs and grievances 
are not met by through political participation, to the satisfaction of the grieved party, the 
grieved party again begins to build dissatisfaction and resentment.  Thus leading the same 
grieved parties to possibly ascertain terrorism as a means through which to be heard and 
have its requests met. 
Now that we have addressed the possible causes and conditions for terrorism, let’s 
consider one of the many theories for eradicating terrorism.  In his book, Terror in the 
Mind of God, Mark Juergensmeyer sums it up quite nicely by describing five potential 
“cures” for terrorism.188  The first “cure” is described as basic brute force, in a sense just 
destroying the terrorist with an overwhelming destructive and annihilating power.189  The 
second is as basic reversal of terror, in that, the mere threat of violence or retaliation by a 
government organization, or the like, may create doubt or vacillation in the minds of a 
terrorist organization, thereby halting their future actions.190  Third, the terrorist 
organization itself, through the use of violence, attains its goal, and hence ceases to use 
further aggressive attacks.191  A fourth ending would be to separate the religious aspects 
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of the cause from the political aspect of the cause.192  As Juergensmeyer points out, and 
many other scholars concur, negotiation with or bullying a religious fundamentalist group 
would most likely be in vain.  Hence, dealing with a political element alone, has a higher 
probability of success and compromise.  Lastly, and almost a reverse to the fourth ending, 
adding a “moral integrity” aspect to politics on the part of the government authorities, by 
basically gaining, at a minimum, a pseudo trust of a terrorist sect by adopting and 
demonstrating a sense of devout morality within the accused governmental 
organization.193  At the same time we must address the assumption that there are several 
variations of outcomes (actions and reactions), but these five represent a good summation 
and generalization of various historical endings. 
At this point we can stop at general conditions of terrorism, because it is from this 
point we can only diverge into the individual causations of the many different dissatisfied 
organizations.  It is at this point that exist the many reasons why some groups chose 
terrorism as their method whiles others do not, and it is here that it becomes an 
overwhelming debate which is beyond the scope of this paper.  With that said, let us 
briefly turn to Islamism as an example of why these conditions will never truly be 
eradicated, why terrorism as a means will never truly be defeated, and why the “cures” 
stated earlier are only effective to a point and don’t address the initial building blocks of 
terrorism. 
The answer and example presented may be over-simplistic in nature, and can lead 
to a lengthily discussion, but this cannot be entirely accomplished within the scope of this 
essay.  Simply put, one reason why these causes and conditions (modernization, settling 
of grievances, and political participation) can never truly be addressed when dealing with 
Islamists, and hence why Islamist sects who exercise terrorism will truly never be 
defeated or go away, rests merely in the complex nature of Islam.  The simple answer is 
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that Islam is a “religion and a state.”194  Many scholars will agree with the statement that 
terrorism by definition is political in nature, and that Islamist themselves are in the 
“fight,” with political agenda in their back pocket.195  In the Islamic faith, there is also no 
objection, by those same scholars, to the fact that in Islam, the religious aspect and 
political aspect are connected by unbreakable bond, for as described by Johannes J.G. 
Jansen’s book, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism.  The problem is two fold.  
First, modernization by nature creates fundamentalists, i.e., those minority groups mainly 
on the fringes of a society who want to return to the days of old, i.e., pre-enlightenment.  
By modernization alone you create a minority group with a grievance.  In a sense, if we 
believe that modernization is necessary for the earth to sustain life, Crenshaw’s first 
condition of terrorism, minority groups with grievances, is inevitable for the foreseeable 
future.  We can not simply turn back the hands of time.  Secondly, when dealing with a 
religious or divine aspect, in most cases there is no compromise.  As Juergensmeyer 
describes, compromise with the religious aspect of a fundamentalist group is near 
impossible. 196  Due to the fact that the Islamist religious aspect is permanently bonded to 
the political aspect, the two shall never be separated. The second condition of terrorism 
cannot be successfully addressed either, due to this unwavering and uncompromising 
nature, especially in the religious aspect, of Islamism.  In a sense, attempting to deal 
politically, and hence create a compromise, with the religious aspects of the Islamic 
would be fruitless.  For this reason, “this prevents the fundamentalist leaders from 
participating in government.”197  It can be said that any of Juergensmeyer’s five “cures” 
could be effective against the Islamist, some better than others, but only up until the point 
where grievances are formed and modernization takes place. 
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Again this scan of terrorism is overly simplistic, but terrorism, especially under 
the Islamic Fundamentalist terrorist wing, will never truly be eradicated.  The fact is, 
there will always be a time and a place, in the constantly modernizing world, where and 
when a weak minority group will feel they must resort to terrorism or a terrorist act in 
order to be heard and create change.  For Islamic fundamentalism, the answer may not lie 
within the boundaries of the causes and conditions of terrorism, or even within the 
elements of globalization, but may lie within the boundaries of the Islamic faith itself.  As 
Marari pointed, out most terrorist groups tend to act within the boundaries of their 
constituency’s approval.198  So, if the terrorism is contained within constituency, it is the 
constituency that must be manipulated to not approve the use of terrorism.  This is a great 
topic of discussion which is currently being research by scholars today. 
D. UNDERSTANDING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT  
The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to 
see. 
Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill 
Is it possible that by holding onto history, sometimes centuries old, and using that 
history to make decision on future endeavors could prevent Arab Middle Easterners from 
making forward progress and truly embracing the globalized world?  Many scholars 
believe that one of the keys to unlocking peace and fostering prosperity in the Middle 
East is through settling the Arab and Israeli conflict.  In general and in a globalized and 
more modern world there seems to be less and less room and less and less tolerance for 
ethno-discrimination.  Therefore settlement of this issue is inevitable and unavoidable.  
For many Middle Easterners, understanding and holding onto the history of their people 
and land is part of their cultural upbringing and key to their lives and future.  Although 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is just one of the many Arab issues, it is still ongoing and 
it tends to resonate with Arabs around the world.  This section will attempt to disseminate 
the basis, or history, of this conflict in order to understand its current characteristics in 
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hopes of understanding how globalization can be used to address and possibly settle 
historical issues between cultures, thus promoting prosperity. 
The Israeli and Palestinian conflict has been raging for almost a century, and 
although there have been periods of “peace” the conflict between these two factions 
continues to take lives on both sides, and is a global issue.  This section will attempt to 
discern some of the historical grounds and sources of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, 
specifically with respect to determining whether or not primordial characteristics were at 
hand during this conflict’s inception or whether primordialism came along at some other 
time.  Furthermore, this paper will examine the Palestinian and Israeli conflict and search 
for examples of other types of cultural conflict theories, i.e., constructivism and 
instrumentalism, to see if they had a presence and affect at any time in the conflict. 
The primary question this section will attempt to answer is whether or not cultural 
identity based on primordial elements, in this specific conflict, “ancient hatreds,” were 
the original triggers or catalyst which led to the Palestinian and Israeli conflict?199  
Furthermore, if primordialism was not the cause of the conflict, this section will attempt 
to bring to light tangible evidence of alternative triggers.  Additionally, if primordialism 
was not the cause of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, has it ever appeared or been 
associated with the conflict, and if so when did it first appear? 
The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been raging since the early 
1900’s, but to analyze this conflict effectively and determine whether or not 
primordialism actually caused this conflict, this paper will first step back and identify the 
origins of the main groups (Arabs and Jews) in the conflict, and determine whether or not 
there are subdivisions within those groups and if so, identify the dynamics.  Moreover, 
this paper will attempt to determine whether of not there are any other influential societal 
groups that exist and determine whether or not they had any effect on the relations 
between Arabs and Jews. 
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Secondly, this section will also attempt to examine the historical outline of the 
conflict and identify the compelling periods of dispute.  Once these periods are identified, 
this paper will observe the evidence and examples of cultural interaction and violence 
within each period in order to determine what conflict elements were present during that 
time.  To do this I will search for the contours of the conflict, mainly underlying factors 
which have instigated the conflict, triggers for episodes of conflict, and the sites of 
contestation.  Diagnosing this evidence should help to assess whether or not 
primordialism was or is present in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict and when it 
originated. 
Of note, although this area is still being disputed, for the purpose of this section 
“Palestine” will be used to describe to disputed area up until the British mandate period 
of 1920, and the “State of Israel” after the British Mandate.  For specific illustration and 
when needed, “Israel” will be used to delineate the Israeli occupied area, and Gaza Strip 
and/or West Bank to describe the Palestinian occupied territory. 
1. Main Groups 
Although there are several subdivisions within either side of the conflict, which I 
will briefly touch upon in the section below, due to the limited scope of this paper, I will 
keep the focus on the foremost division and controversy between the Jewish Israelis and 
the Arab Palestinians.  With this caveat in mind, there may be times throughout the paper 
when a brief subdivision dialogue will be presented, such as discussing Hamas and Fatah 
opposition. 
Currently within the State of Israel and Palestinian occupied territories there are 
several ethnic and religious divides.  The two main groups in the current Israeli-
Palestinian conflict are obviously the Israelis and the Palestinians, but within these two 
main groups and within the state itself there are subdivisions as well as Christians, Druze, 
Samaritans, and several other smaller groups.  Problematic internal divides within the 
population such as Arab Israelis or Arab citizens of Israel and Jewish settlers who occupy 
Palestinian land, complicate this conflict even further.  The current demographics of this 
area are depicted below: 
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Israel:  Population–7,112,359 (note: includes about 187,000 Israeli settlers in the West 
Bank, about 20,000 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and fewer than 177,000 in 
East Jerusalem (July 2008 est.)). Religion–Jewish 76.4%, Muslim 16%, Arab Christians 
1.7%, other Christian 0.4%, Druze 1.6%, unspecified 3.9% (2004).200  
West Bank: Population–2,407,681 (note: in addition, there are about 187,000 Israeli 
settlers in the West Bank and fewer than 177,000 in East Jerusalem (July 2008 est.)). 
Religion–Muslim 75% (predominantly Sunni), Jewish 17%, Christian and other 8%).201 
Gaza Strip: Population–1,500,202 (July 2008 est.). Religion–Muslim (predominantly 
Sunni) 99.3%, Christian 0.7%).202 
Given the length of time this conflict has been going on, there are Jews who are 
indigenous to the area (mainly Ashkenazi), and there are Jews who have migrated to the 
area (mostly Sephardim and Mizrahim).  On the other hand, there are Arabs who are also 
indigenous and who have migrated to the area too.  Furthermore, Hebrew and Arabic are 
the two official languages of the area. Moreover, Hebrew being the primary language is 
spoken by most Israelis, yet there is still a minority of Jewish population who immigrated 
from Arab countries and use Arabic as their primary language.  Over the recent years and 
due mainly to the violent conflict and attempted negotiations, this area has been divided 
into fairly homogeneous zones, where Palestinians mainly occupy the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip and the Israelis occupy all other areas (to include some parts of the West 
Bank), there are pockets of heterogeneous living arrangements which stem from 
historical boundaries and claims. 
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For the Israelis and according to Zionist and Jewish historical beliefs, the now 
contested area, somewhere before ~1500 BCE, was known as Eretz Isreal, and was home 
to an ancient Jewish community.203  At that time native ethnic Jews, otherwise know as 
the Hebrews, had settled the land.  Fast forward through several hundred years, several 
violent territorial conflicts, and the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and Arabs 
populated the land, made up a majority of the population, and claimed the State of 
Palestine as their homeland.  Jewish groups, although a minority, still populated portions 
of the land, and around the turn of the 19th century, Jewish Nationalism spawned a 
movement which encouraged and influenced an influx of Jews to return back to their 
historical homeland.  
Currently, there is a subdivision within the Palestinian National Authority, which 
has been fractured by the elected organization Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip.  Baring the split within Palestinian authority and some fractions within the 
Israel population, the Palestinians and the Israelis are oppositional groups within the State 
of Israel.  Numerous external groups and nations are engaged in and influence the 
relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
With this information in mind, we can start to build an argument for and against 
the primordial nature of this conflict.  The two major groups in and of themselves are 
distinctly different in culture, tradition, and language, but what they share is common 
territory.  The primordial nature of both these groups individually revolves around 
“shared blood,” ancestral relations, and kinships ties.204  But if we look back in history to 
some of the initial interaction within this area, there was little conflict, between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, caused by the contrasting traditions.  In fact, conflict 
between these two groups did not really erupt until transformations outside of their 
control began to change the landscape and demographics of the area.205 
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2. Periods of Conflict 
The period of conflict that this paper with cover spans from 1917 to the present 
day.  But as Mr. Churchill stated, “the farther backward you can look, the farther forward 
you are likely to see,” and I believe this statement is very applicable in this case.  This 
paper will be divided into four distinct periods, pre-twentieth century (pre-1900s), British 
Mandate (1920–1948), United Nations partition (1948–1999), and the present twenty-
first century (2000–present).  During this historical examination, we can begin to see how 
manipulation of the landscape, war, conquest, colonization, and immigration changed the 
demographics of the area.  As major events shifted control of this area, each new 
governing force enacted its own changes; in this situation the territory changed hands 
several times.  The indigenous Jewish population was expelled from the land of which it 
had significant historical and religious ties to, and as Monica Toft explains there is an 
importance to how groups are tied to certain pieces of territory.206  
a. Pre-20th Century 
The build up to the current problems in the Levant stem from a history of 
conflict and change which actually dates back several thousands of years.  Much of the 
historical works which describe this area revolve around religious and territorial aspects.  
In a sense, what was created in many societies during this time, as Benedict Anderson 
explained, were “cultural artifacts” around which groups formed particular ideologies and 
cultural systems.207  Ancient indigenous Jews, formed religious communities, spoke a 
sacred language, and eventually became guardians of their “holy land.”208  The current 
State of Israel has linkages back to the ancient Kingdom of Judah, other wise known as 
the Land of Israel or Eretz Yisrael, the Holy Land, Land of Canaan, Palestine, and many 
others.209  Additionally, the State of Israel has Jewish historical discourse and tradition 
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which reference the area and its relevance to the birth place of Abraham’s Father.210  
With this evidence we begin to see less primordial attributes and more of a constructed 
identity based around symbolism and history.  
Palestine and the surrounding land had gone through numerous changes 
and conflicts stemming from Egyptian rule (~1500 BCE), Persian (~500 BCE), Greek 
(~300 BCE), to Roman rule (~63 BCE–630 CE), each leaving its mark on the society at 
hand.  Of note, the period of Roman rule was particularly important, because of the 
brutality which took place within the Jewish communities in the area.  Jews that stayed 
became part of and assimilated to the Roman civilization, while others were exiled or 
scattered and absorbed by the surrounding and more accepting societies.  There is no 
doubt that the Roman conquest of this area and the resultant ethnic conflict between the 
Romans and Jews had primordial aspects mainly due to the extreme and immutable 
differences in religion.  As a result the Jewish community was disfigured by force and 
violence. 
Finally, the Arab Muslims came to rule the area of the Palestine, which 
fell under the Caliphate, in 634 CE.  Initially, the Qur’an references the “Holy Land” as 
the land which is to be inhabited by Moses’ people, better known as the Jews.211  Later 
on, the Qur’an makes references to the Holy Land and in short proclaims that God or 
Allah banded Moses’ people from the Holy Land and that Muslims would “inherit the 
land.”212  We can begin to see the establishment of conflict arise as early as 632 CE when 
the Qur’an was fully revealed to the divine Prophet Mohammed, and this became even 
more problematic once the Qur’an, Torah, and Bible went into printed form.  This is 
extremely significant with regards to the longevity and passion of Palestinian and Israeli 
conflict, because at this point historical religious references in both groups now lay claim 
to the same land, which was fostered by the word of a divine power, and the same divine 
power to be exact. 
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Jews and Christians were allowed to live, do business, and practice their 
religions under the Arab Caliphate.  Jews who had been previously banished from the 
lands of the Israeli state were allowed to return. During this time, cities like Jerusalem 
experienced extensive immigration and an influx of mainly Arab and Jewish people from 
all across the region.  Much of this peaceful interaction between these two groups during 
the Arab rule was due to the familiarity which was felt between the Muslims, who had 
similar religious monotheistic roots, and the Jews or “People of the Book” as they were 
come to be known.  There is little evidence to prove why the Arabs and Jews were able to 
live peacefully during this time period, other than their shared monotheistic roots, which 
is evidence to the fact that primordial conflict was not a factor early on in their 
interaction.  The strict numeric dominance of the Arab population did not seem to prove 
to be a significant case of conflict at that time.  As Paul Collier pointed out, conflict in 
situations like these is usually limited because groups like the Jews, during that time, had 
no real motivation or grievances with the more dominant Arab society at this point.213  
Collier goes on further to explain that with ethnic dominance as a factor, societies which 
are ethnic and religiously diverse tend to be less confrontational.214  Again in this case, if 
we look to the religious practices of either group, Arabs tolerated Jewish religious 
practices as was dictated in the Qur’an, and the Jewish population therefore had little if 
any organized grievances especially as compared to the likes of their previous Roman 
occupiers. 
Following mainly Arab occupation, along with sparse Jewish settlements, 
Palestine saw more foreign conflict and war over the next century and a half.  The 
ownership and occupation of the area was in constant fluctuation until finally ending up 
in the hand of the Ottomans from 1516 until 1917, although there were brief periods of 
French (1799) and Egyptian (1831–1841) occupation during that time.215  The Ottomans 
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began to organize their territory and define boarders, although Palestine, as it was called 
back then, still did not have clearly defined borders and no real defined area. 
This period of Ottoman Rule is significant, because it continued to set the 
stage for the eventual conflict between the Arab Palestinians and the Jewish population.  
What we have seen over the past thousand years or so, is the way Palestine’s society was 
constructed and changed over time to reflect a new balance of ethnically diverse groups.  
Under the Ottoman Empire, both Arab and Jewish populations were now dominated by 
an external force, greater than either individual group.  Over the years of domination by 
the Ottomans, neither group was expelled which resulted in both groups becoming more 
entrenched and settled.  Again, little if any conflict between the Jews and Arabs of 
Palestine was present during this time.  Ottoman control over the new rising political 
institutions and instruments of the 18th and early 19th century limited the struggles for 
economic and political power by both groups.216  What would happen after Ottoman 
occupation disappeared?  How would the Arab Palestinians and Jewish populations view 
the land?  How would new imperialistic forces be viewed, and how would they treat the 
indigenous Arabs and Jews?  Both groups now had historical roots (Jews more than the 
Arabs), and established communities (Arabs more than the Jews) co-located in the same 
areas.  What would be the dominating factor(s) which would drive these two groups to 
conflict? 
b. British Directive Period (1920–1948) 
Until the 20th century relations between the Jewish people and the Arabs 
had been rather peaceful and passive, but as we will see in this period, manipulation and 
external institutions play a major role in changing the dynamics of societies within the 
Levant area.  As Jillian Schwedler stated, relationships between groups are really just the 
“product of historical processes and experiences through which individuals and groups 
come to see themselves, their place in the world, and their relationship with those around 
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them.”217  Although a constructed foundation was built from continuous external warring 
and area dominance, Jewish emigration, and Arab immigration, the basis for the 
Palestinian and Israeli conflict formed several thousand years ago, and the catalyst which 
sparked the ethnic conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians was only introduced 
around the end of World War I. 
The Skyes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which stated that much of the Levant 
area would be become a neutral international zone after the war, was one of the initiating 
catalytic processes.218  The Skyes-Picot Agreement in itself did not initially change the 
outlook of the groups in the Levant, but promoted the idea that the territory, after the war, 
could potentially be influenced and manipulated by the Allied “winners” of WWI.219  
This was one of the first attempts at social manipulation in this area, based on 
international policies and enforced by external social forces.  This type of social 
manipulation was not necessarily the same level of elite social construction, in Fearon 
and Laitin’s view, where the point is to manipulate or create sides in order to produce 
opposing factions.220  In this case, the consequences of unintended British social 
manipulation, although arguable, still promoted their own gains and helped them to reach 
their own ends, and the resulting division it caused, was just as intrusive and precarious 
as intended social manipulation.   
Following the Skyes-Picot Agreement were secret talks and bargaining 
between the British and Jewish nationalist organizers.  The classified Balfour Declaration 
of 1917 basically stated that in exchange for Jewish support (mainly financial) and upon 
the surrender of the Ottoman Empire, the British government would assist in establishing 
a Jewish state in the region known as Palestine.221  Although the goal of the Balfour 
Declaration was to eventually establish a Jewish national home, it was not meant to 
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disrupt the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the area.  Although this is not in itself evidence 
of social manipulation per se, it adds further fuel to the eventual and long range conflict 
between the Jewish and Palestinian population.  Capital and support was received by the 
British from interested Jewish institutions during the war, further establishing a moral 
obligation by the British to eventual make good on their promise.222  Again, this is 
evidence that negligible maliciousness on either the British or the Jewish side was present 
during this time, but pressure to follow through on deals made would result in 
unintentional negligence, which would eventually help to spark conflict.  
The Ottomans did eventually surrender in 1918, yet the Skyes-Picot 
Agreement was disregarded, and the territory of the Levant was divided up primarily 
between the French and British, and placed under their direct European control.  Britain 
ended up controlling the area of Palestine and declared the official languages of the area 
to be English, Arabic, and Hebrew.  Although exact boundaries for Palestine had not 
been settled among the victors of the war, pressure began to arise among the areas small 
indigenous Jewish population and numerous international Jewish supporters, who had 
been promise a piece of the post war Levant pie.  Settlement of the boarders came about 
five years later, in 1923. 
Over the years leading up to the World War II, the disputed British 
mandate over Palestine and the now open British promise to subdivide Palestine into an 
Arab and Jewish state became a hot topic among the members of the League of Nations 
and many Arabs Leaders as well, and with no true resolution.  During this time the 
British not only allowed Jewish immigration into Palestine, but encouraged it as well.223  
Furthermore, the British fostered land ownership within Palestine.  Britain’s policy of 
large-scale Jewish immigration and land purchase sparked discontent, civil disorder, and 
finally revolt by indigenous and discontent Arab majority population.  Similarly, 
surrounding Arabs nations began to support the distressed Palestinians. 
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Over the next 20 years, despite Arab resentment, the Jewish population 
continued to grow within Palestine under British authorization, political tensions among 
the Jews and Arabs began to build, and ideas of a Jewish statehood began to actually take 
hold.  Ethnic divisions between the Jews and Arabs became apparent in the several areas, 
such as education, business, and public roles with in the society.  With support from the 
governing British and external Jewish organizations, it was clear these two societies were 
beginning to diverge in very different directions.  Because of the diverging paths, Arab 
and Jewish nationalism became salient.  As with any change in social structure of a 
society fear of one party can be sparked by the collapse or perception of collapse of ones 
own society.224  Arabs within Palestine began to see the Jews as a threat to their society 
and Jews could see a glimpse of a possible opportunity for self rule.225  Is it possible that 
resentment and eventually hatred of the Jewish population, as Roger Petersen predicts 
happens once an ethnic threat has been identified, would soon follow and become the 
basis for conflict?226  Furthermore, if hatred did result from this conflict was it of the 
primordial or “Ancient Hatred” kind, or more of a created (constructed) and divisive 
(instrumental) sort, manipulated to generate nationalism and eventual make violent 
attacks permissive? 
After the Second World War finished, bilateral discussions between the 
Arab and Jewish populations came to no consensus and no policy suggestions were 
approved by either the Jew or the Arab parties.  A war weakened Britain, who planned to 
withdrawn from Palestine and saw the need for reconciliation between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians prior to their departure, led the fruitless discussions.  It is at this point in the 
conflict that we begin to see the early stages of attempted conflict intervention and 
negotiations, but problems arise during this period because the external mediator (Britain) 
seemed unable to address the area problems or offer agreeable solution.  As Timothy Sisk 
argued, managing complex negotiation involves “trained mediators” who can provide 
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timely solutions and “creditable commitments,” neither of which Britain could offer at 
that time, because a majority of its attention was spent on recovering from the war.227 
In 1947, Britain, obviously inadequate and ill-equipped, turned the Jewish 
and Arab issue over to a United Nations (UN) special committee which studied the 
problem and created a plan of partition, which arguable favored the Jews over the 
Arabs.228  Although the General Assembly voted to accept the committee’s proposal, 
Arab UN members as well as Palestinian Arabs opposed it, and the Arab world as a 
whole was enraged. 
c. United Nations partition (1948–2000) 
The Palestinian and Israeli conflict really begins to spillover during this 
time.  The third period, from 1948 to 2000, marks a period of colonial transition, war, and 
a major shift in power and control of Palestine state to a newly formed State of Israel.  On 
14 May 1948, the British finally withdrew from Palestine believing that their withdrawal 
would initiate peace between the two factions.  Instead, the withdrawal created a large 
power vacuum leftover from years of colonial oversight and security.  In effect, the 
British withdrawal led to increased violence between the Arabs and the Jews, and finally 
led to civil unrest in the same year.  Again there is little proof of primordialism during 
this time, and the fact is that the disgruntlement was due to the constructed nature of the 
partition, which in the Arab minds was unfair, and hence created an obvious territorial 
grievance.  Toft’s point of the importance and view of territory to opposing factions is 
one of the most important insight to a conflict, but maybe even more so in this specific 
case.229  To the Arabs this land was theirs, and they now had significant historical and 
religious ties, which only added to more fuel to the fire.  For the Jews, they too had 
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historical ties and now international approval (non-Arab states).  Here we begin to see the 
influence of external spoilers such as the United States for Israel and Jordan, Iran, Egypt, 
and Lebanon for the Palestinians. 
After the initial Palestinian revolt, the more organized, better trained, and 
newly formed Israeli army quickly defeated the less organized Palestinians, and 
following their victory the Jewish community declared Israel an independent state.   
Nations such as the United States, Britain, and Russia quickly recognized this 
declaration, but Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan were again outraged 
and moved armed forces into Arab areas of the contested territory.  The Arab-Israeli War 
ensued until a 1949 armistice, supervised by the UN, was created between the 
surrounding Arab states and the Israeli Army.  During the war, a majority Arabs had left 
their homes and fled to Arab control areas of the country, and following the defeat were 
now consisted refugees.  New stable frontiers and boundaries were formed, officiated 
under the UN, but to add insult to injury, the Arab defeat, also caused the Israelis to 
increase and occupied an even greater amount of land.  Momentum to continue fighting 
was lost, especially by the Palestinians and Arab allies. 
In the years following the Arab defeat (1950s and 1960s), a rise in Arab 
Nationalism began to mount in the Middle East, led by Egyptian President Gamel Abdel 
Nasser, who was also very popular among Palestinians.  Pan-Arab nationalism peaked 
1967 when Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab nations again engaged the Israeli Army 
in a war over the Israeli/Palestinian lands. 
The third period of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict (1967 to 1993) 
began with the defeat of the Arab forces by the Israelis in the Six Day War.  This defeat 
not only led to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Gaza Strip and West Bank territory, it 
also led to Israeli control of additional Arab territory identified as the Sinai Peninsula, 
East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. 
Although Arab Nationalism as a whole faded into history, remnants of the 
movement still remained within Palestine and began to form and rally around Palestinian 
nationalism.  The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially gained the right to 
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represent the Arabs of Palestine in 1974.  The years that followed the formation of the 
PLO were plagued with continuous violence within Palestinian and Israeli territory.  The 
First Intifada (1987–1993) was initiated by the Palestinian in an effort to rise against the 
1967 Israeli occupation.  During the First Intifada the PLO claimed a State of Palestine 
status, although no state was official recognized by the UN.  Regardless, the claim aided 
in rallying Arabs and once again created a national Palestinian identity. 
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords by the Arab Palestinians and the 
Israelis and led by the United States put and end to the First Intifada.  The Oslo Accords 
set the framework from which the two factions would eventual agree upon an 
administration and territorial control turnover over of Palestine which would officially 
consist of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  As Timothy Sisk explains, one of the 
desirable peace making options is to conduct the peace process in secret in order to 
quickly negotiate peace, with little outside distraction.230  Although this option can be 
effective as Sisk writes, it is usually more desirable for more transparent talks in cases 
where long term and sustainable peace is desired.231  Much of the Oslo Accords process 
took place in secret and behind closed doors, and which was deemed to be one of the 
reasons why it had initial success.232  The process itself was set to take approximately 
three years with final settlement terms completed by the middle of 1996.233  Possibly, 
distrust and loss of credibility between the representatives and leadership (at the time, 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
chairman Yasser Arafat) of both sides and their constituents led to constant break downs 
in the process and significantly delayed any further reconciliation.  In 2000, the failure of 
the Oslo Accords and hence the failure to create a truly independent Palestinian State, led 
to a second, more violent, intifada.234 
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Some critics of Yasser Arafat argue that he had more to gain (financially) 
from keeping the conflict going.235  If this is believed or proven to be true then it would 
point to definite elite manipulation and personal agendas.  Again, the initial spark for the 
conflict was obviously not started by him, but it can be said that he help to continue it and 
almost promote it.  What this illustrates is that although the conflict began under different 
circumstances, significant individuals, groups, and events, both internal and external to 
the conflict can has severe impacts to the initial cause of conflict as well as the fuel to 
keep it going.  
d. The Twenty-First Century and the Second Intifada (2000–
Present) 
After all the attempted peace initiatives, the Cave of Patriarchs massacre, 
failed negotiations on both sides, the Israeli establishment of check-points, constant 
violence, Palestinian economic deterioration and suicide attacks, and finally failed 
intervention by external social forces, the Palestinian and Israel conflict has continued 
“bleed” over into the 21st century.  There are two positions.  From the Israeli side the 
reason for failure was due to the Palestinian’s impatience with the peaces process, and 
from the Palestinian point of view the process failed because the Israelis had dragged 
their feet and had no true intention handing over complete military and political control 
of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  Although much of the background and fuel, which 
sparked the failure of the Oslo peace process, took place just over the past fifty years; the 
Palestinian Second Intifada has encompassed spoiler influences (mainly from Arab states 
like Iran, and Western states like the United States), ancestral issues and claims, religious 
and historical references, and dating back thousands of years.  This is more evidence that 
this period of the conflict encompasses not only constructivism, but primordial elements 
as well. 
More important than the historical references and spoilers was the Israeli 
decision to pull completely out of the Palestinian territories (Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank) in 2006.  As Svante Cornell pointed out, this could have been a huge and 
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detrimental mistake, given the negative impacts of “ethicizing territory.”236  The result of 
Palestine’s autonomy is evidence to Cornell’s and Nancy Bermeo’s point, the 
homogeneity can be even more dangerous than heterogeneity, or in this case Israeli 
occupation.237  The point being that, although both sides supposedly wanted a peaceful 
resolution, the consequential outcome of Palestinian autonomy was exactly opposite of 
what either party wanted, and in fact it spurred more hate and discontent among the 
Palestinians toward the Israelis and initiated internal fighting among Palestinians (mainly 
between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank and which continues 
today).  The question then remains, if a two state solution or federalism is not the answer 
than what is?   
As it stands today, there are several outstanding central topics that have 
been created just over the past fifty years, which stem from boarder disputes, to the 
occupation and ownership of the city of Jerusalem, security within both territories, to 
issues of Palestinian refugees, and finally resource allocation (especially water).  Some of 
the controversy still rallies around, religious and biblical references, but more so around 
the recently created mistrust and hatred cause by Palestinian terrorism and 
disproportionate Israeli military reactions. 
3. Summary 
This section attempted to bring to light some of the initial causes and enablers of 
the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, and discover whether or not primordial characteristics 
were present at the time of the conflict’s inception, whether primordialism came along at 
a later time, or whether primordialism has ever present during the conflict.  This paper 
also examined the Palestinian and Israeli conflict to see if the other ethnic conflict 
theories, those of constructivism or instrumentalism, have been present at any time in the 
conflict.   
                                                 
236 Svante Cornell, “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical 
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237 Nancy Bermeo, “The Import of Institutions,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2) (April 2002), 96, and 
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This section’s findings seem to further support the case that primordialism had 
little to do with the initial conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, and points to 
constructivism as the original caused of conflict between the Arabs and Jews.  This can 
be attributed mainly to the fact that prior to the post World War I British mandate in the 
early 1900s, little violence existed between the indigenous Arab and Jewish Palestinian 
inhabitants.  In fact, prior to the 20th century and as historical evidence has revealed, after 
numerous foreign battles, wars, and domination exhibited by several external forces over 
the now disputed area, the relationship between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine was 
rather reasonable. 
Paradoxically, two distinctly different cultures formed historical and religious ties 
to the land.  Although the Jewish population claims to have inhabited the area of Israel 
first, which has been verified to be true by both cultures and within each group’s ancient 
religious text (the Bible for the Jews and the Qur’an for the Arabs), Arab culture and text 
(Qur’an) claimed that Allah or God banished the Jews from the land, which happened 
during the Roman occupation, and that Arabs would inherit the land, which happened 
during the Arab Caliphate.  If one believes that both of these documents (Bible and 
Qur’an) were conceived by man, which they were, and pasted on through both story 
telling and oral history, then it can be argued that it was early constructivism which 
actually aided in manipulating those societies and creating the historical and divine bond 
of those people to this disputed land.     
Given the failure of the British to settle the disputed between the Arabs and Jews 
and the religious and historical ties that both of these factions claimed, the eventual 
United Nations (UN) partition was the final straw which broke the Arab back and created 
enough pressure to initiate violent conflict.  Here again we see the infusion of a social 
institution’s (UN) interference and resultant outcome of intensified ethnic conflict and 
violence.  Although the UN’s intentions were to establish peace, the result was quite the 
opposite.  Again, even the UN’s arguably sincere but unsuccessful attempts at 
establishing peace, screamed of constructivism.  It is also open to question, yet not easily 
proven, that external spoilers and nations, on either side of the conflict, had individual 
agendas which only added to the constructed nature of this conflict. 
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Although constructivism can be easily seen in the early stages leading up to as 
well as throughout the conflict, instrumentalism is less obvious and more difficult to 
prove given the secrecy of some events and undisclosed evidence to the fact.  With that in 
mind it can be only argued that instrumentalism with in Palestinian and Israeli conflict 
really only began once strong leaders and influential political parties formed around each 
faction.  One of the specific claims of theories is that Yasser Arafat was receiving 
monetary funds, which he used for personal gain during the conflict, and that it was in his 
personal interest to keep the fractions in conflict and never come to a consensus.  
Whether he continuously sponsored terrorism in Israeli territory or purposely failed 
negotiations with Israelis is still debatable, much of the evidence (his enormous bank 
accounts and perceived terrorist ties) points to what could be called or seen as elite 
manipulation or instrumentalism, although this point is very weak. 
What is strongly supported is the fact that primordialism does not truly rear its 
unruly head until after the failure of the Oslo accords in 2000 and even more so after the 
eventual autonomy given to the Palestinian with the implementation of the Israeli 
disengagement plan of 2005.  This primordialism was evident throughout the First 
Intifada, but really took hold through the Second Intifada and mainly during the 
establishment of Islamist groups like Hamas, who began rallying around the guise of 
Islamic fundamentals and the extensive and overwhelming Arab Muslim ancestry.  
Groups like Hamas tend to use ethnic and ethnic identities as well as perceived ancient 
hatreds as rallying points to gather support for their cause.  What is evident today is that 
the Palestinian and Israeli conflict tends to be a thorn in the side of many Middle Eastern 
Arab Muslims today, who without knowing all the facts and history about the conflict 
automatically and overwhelmingly side with their Arab Palestinian “brothers,” in a 
“natural” kinship manner. 
What this section has illustrated is that the ongoing Palestinian and Israeli conflict 
cannot be assigned to one specific conflict theory alone.  In fact, complex conflicts of this 
nature and like the one between Palestinians and Israelis can begin and display elements 
of one theory or another, and as time progresses, shift and show signs of a different 
theory altogether.  What is important in dissecting the Palestinian and Israeli conflict is 
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looking back deep into the history of both ethnic groups, and examining the foundation 
from which the conflict was built.  Furthermore it explains the significance of Sir 
Winston Churchill quote, “The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you 
are likely to see,” basically that if we are able to understand our history and learn from it, 
therefore not allowing it to hinder our forward progress, maybe the acceptance of a 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the shape of globalization in the Arab Islamic Middle 
East, specifically with respect to three major elements of globalization, those of politics, 
economics, and culture.  This thesis attempted to shed light on the importance and 
difficulties of fostering positive conditions, which could facilitate favorable terms for 
Islamic Arabs in the Middle East to fully embrace current globalization, thus increasing 
the region’s prosperity and stability, and eventual having positive implementations on the 
world as a whole.  Moreover, this thesis challenged and analyzed the compatibility of 
Islamic Arabs in the Middle East with current globalization trends.  Although the topic of 
globalization is a fairly large and a constantly evolving subject to cover, the scope of this 
research was narrowed down to address the issue of acceptance of the elements of 
democracy, capitalism and cultural shifts by the Arab Islamic Middle East, and 
specifically the secular authoritarian regimes and the opposing Islamists within those 
social structures.  With this in mind, this thesis emphasized and brought to light several 
obstacles which stand in the way of such progress and decrease the prosperity and 
stability within the Middle East region. 
The topic embracing globalization in the Middle East originated from the 
observed issues in which the world community, in general, has encountered due to the 
regional stagnation of the region, which has been attributed to the increased political, 
economic, and cultural turmoil created partly by the Middle Eastern authoritarian leaders, 
western powers, and fanatic Islamic religious organizations.  The objective of this thesis 
was to highlight the affects of current globalization on the Arab Islamic Middle East and 
bring to light ideas and solutions which could potentially help to marginalize or moderate 
the turmoil within the region, leaving more time, energy, and resources for the 
enrichment of the region and population at large, and potentially the world as a whole. 
This thesis has attempted to look at the Middle Eastern crisis through a political, 
economical, and cultural lens, and postulate how Islamic Arabs could eventual and fully 
accept the influence of current globalization into the societies and states in which they 
live.  What this thesis concluded was that globalization can be obtained successfully in 
 114
the Middle East and that the affects of positive economic growth, political autonomy, and 
cultural modernity can light the way for a better quality of life for Islamic Arab 
populations.  What was also concluded was that the reality and acceptance of 
globalizations is theoretically easier said than done, and that in order to pursue a path to a 
better life quality life, secular authoritarian regimes must adjust their political structures, 
Islamists must moderate their political agendas, and culture shifts within the populous 
must take place.  
Undoubtedly, Middle Eastern globalization is not just about the Middle Eastern 
states and their leadership, and there is another variable in this equation.  This thesis 
concluded that those states which encourage, foster, and promote current globalization 
trends and its elements around the world, have a responsibility too.  The problem is that 
globalization will not be accepted at face value nor will it be accepted voluntarily, and by 
no means should it be forced upon the Middle East.  Furthermore, forcing globalization 
onto societies that are neither prepared for nor educated on the political, economic, and 
cultural changes will not only be counter productive to the globalization process, but will 
make it difficult and perhaps impossible to build the necessary groundwork upon which 
Middle Eastern productivity and prosperity should be built upon.  Therefore, it has been 
concluded that the responsibility of those states encouraging globalization, in this case 
mainly western powers, to learn about and truly study those Middle Eastern societies 
which have not embraced globalization.  Those powers must accurately understand the 
history, personality, and culture of those societies, and create relationships which will aid 
in the coordination of tailored societal globalization learning.  Additionally, and more 
importantly, Arab Islamic Middle Eastern societies must be made aware and see the 
benefits of fostering current globalization.  Lastly, a society which is educated on, 
passionate about, and truly comprehends globalization can use the benefits of 
globalization to its advantage and can prosper. 
This thesis was not an all inclusive study of every factor of Islamic politics, 
economics, culture, or religious factors which affect a specific country’s economy.  The 
objective of this thesis was to bring to light the effects Islamists, authoritarian regime 
leadership, and external powers and demonstrate those effects affect the prosperity and 
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lives of the Arab Islamic Middle Eastern people, by creating shifts in motivation, work 
behaviors, as well as many other facets of the population.  Conversely, there are some 
Middle Eastern countries, or outliers, which have done well when compared to the world 
market, e.g., Saudi Arabia; even in light of their less then pretentious support of cultural 
or religious globalization.  This thesis determined that these outliers can be explained 
through understanding the long and short term effects of historical shaping events such as 
colonization, and decolonization, wars, and most of all the resource of “oil.”  
Furthermore, we must recognize that these outliers also maintain a large gap between the 
“Have and Have Not,” and as Albert Hourani recognized, the gap between the rich and 
the poor in the Middle East has continued to grow in relation to the increasing profits 
from oil.238  Kahn and Weiner wrote that “nearly half of the people in the world still live 
on less than $2 a day and a fifth survive on $1 or less… the Middle East and Central Asia 
are poorer than at the cold war's close, despite the fast economic integration of the 
1990's.”239  The fact is that current statistics are truly not that different in the Middle East 
of the 2000s. 
Finally, in the last chapter, this thesis concluded that technology, cultural 
understanding, and historical perspective, are major factors in how globalization is 
received by the societies of the Arab Islamic Middle East.  For the preponderance of the 
Arab countries with Muslim majorities, there seems to be a lag in their ability to break 
out from under a so called Arab or Islamic affect.  The question here is not whether Arab 
culture or Islamic religion is good or bad for individuals directly, but for example 
whether or not some of the Islamic religious traditions, financial laws, practices, and 
media or information restraints, are good for a country’s development and promotion of 
the positive influences of globalization.  This thesis is by no means stating that Arab 
Islamic countries should not practice Islamic or religious traditions or maintain Islamic 
economic systems or maintain authority over information trafficking, rather it is 
suggesting that it is possible for Islamic traditions to positively or negatively affect the 
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overall economic wellbeing of countries which tend to be predominantly Muslim.  Most 
would argue that the practice and enforcement of Islam and all of its traditions have 
positive attributes which can improve the wellbeing of the society in which it has been 
practiced.  On the other hand, some studies have attempted to prove that countries with 
strong religious beliefs, although secular in nature, do very well in the international 
economic market (Japan, South Korea, and Singapore).240  Other studies have attempted 
to show that the religiosity of a country actually has a profoundly negative impact on 
overall economic development.241 
When we look at the Arab Islamic Middle East and break it down into political, 
economic, and cultural elements it can be demonstrated that globalization can end up 
having a significant effect on the prosperity of this region.  Although, religion and specify 
Islam and authoritarian regimes are not individually the sole hinders of globalization in 
the Middle East, when combined they can and do tend to obstruct and form barriers to 
this potentially prosperous phenomenon.  The answer then, is for those countries which 
foster globalization, to help educate and encourage this current round of globalization in 
those countries of the Arab Islamic Middle East. 
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